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Abstract
Models of single district plurality elections show that with three parties anything
can happen - extreme policies can win regardless of voter preferences. I show that
when single district elections are used to fill a legislature, we get back to a world where
the median voter matters. An extreme policy will generally only come about if it is
preferred to a more moderate policy by the median voter in a majority of districts.
The mere existence of a centrist party can lead to moderate outcomes even if the party
itself wins few seats. I also show that, while some voters in a district will not vote for
their nationally preferred party, in many equilibria they will want the candidate for
whom they vote to win that district. This is never the case in single district elections.
There, some voters always want the candidate they voted for to lose.
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1 Introduction
Plurality rule (a.k.a. first-past-the-post) is used to elect legislatures in the U.S., U.K.,
Canada, India, Pakistan, Malaysia as well as a host of other former British colonies - yet
we know very little about how it performs in such settings. The literature on single district
elections shows that plurality rule performs well when there are only two candidates but
poorly when there are more (Myerson (2000, 2002)). Indeed, plurality has recently been
deemed the worst voting rule by a panel of voting theorists (Laslier (2012)). However, the
objectives of voters differ in single district and legislative elections. In a legislative election,
many districts hold simultaneous plurality elections and the winner of each district takes
a seat in a legislature. Once all seats are filled, the elected politicians bargain over the
formation of government and implement policy. If voters only care about which policy is
implemented in the legislature, they will cast their ballots to influence the outcome of the
legislative bargaining stage. A voter’s preferred candidate will therefore depend on the results
in other districts. In contrast, in a single district election - such as a mayoral election - a
voter’s preference ordering over candidates is fixed, as only the local result matters. These
different objectives are at the heart of this paper. I show that when three parties compete
for legislative seats and voters care about national policy, several undesirable properties of
plurality rule are mitigated.
While there has been some key work on legislative elections with three parties under
proportional representation, scant attention has been paid to this setting under plurality
rule. Studies of plurality rule have either focused on two-party legislative competition or
else on three-party single district elections. In the former case, as voters face a choice of
two parties, they have no strategic decision to make - they simply vote for their favourite.
However, for almost all countries using plurality rule, with the notable exception of the
U.S., politics is not a two-party game: the U.K. has the Conservatives, Labour and the
Liberal Democrats; Canada has the Conservatives, Liberals, and New Democrats; India has
Congress, BJP and many smaller parties.1 With a choice of three candidates, voters must
consider how others will vote when deciding on their own ballot choice.
In a single plurality election, only one candidate can win. Therefore, when faced with
a choice of three options, voters who prefer the candidate expected to come third have an
incentive to abandon him and instead vote for their second favourite, so that in equilibrium
only two candidates receive votes. These are the only serious candidates. This effect is
1The recent 2015 UK election witnessed a further fragmentation of the political landscape with the
Scottish National Party gaining a large number of seats. Other countries with plurality rule and multiple
parties represented in the legislature include: Bangladesh, Botswana, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia,
Mongolia, Pakistan, Trinidad & Tobago, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.
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known as Duverger’s law.
A vast literature has pointed out two implications of Duverger’s law in single district
elections (Palfrey (1989); Myerson and Weber (1993); Cox (1997); Fey (1997); Myerson
(2002); Myatt (2007)). First, “anything goes”: the equilibrium is completely driven by
voters’ beliefs, so any of the three candidates could be abandoned, leaving the other two to
share the vote. This means that, regardless of voter preferences, there can always be extreme
policy outcomes - where a race between the two extreme choices results in an implemented
policy far away from the centre. Second, when each of the three choices is preferred by some
voter, there will always be misaligned voting. That is, some people will vote for an option
which is not their most preferred.2 Misaligned voting undermines the legitimacy of the
elected candidate: one candidate may win a majority simply to “keep out” a more despised
opponent, so the winner’s policies may actually be preferred by relatively few voters.
In this paper, I model a legislative election in which each voter casts a ballot in a local
district but their utility depends on policy determined in the national parliament. I show
that while extreme policy outcomes and misaligned voting are always possible in stand-
alone multi-candidate plurality elections, they can both be mitigated in a legislative election
setting.
The intuition for the first result is as follows. For an extreme policy to come about, either
the left or right party must win a majority of seats. For any party to win a majority of seats in
the legislature it must be that they are preferred to some alternative by a majority of voters
in a majority of districts. I show that the alternative to a left majority will generally not
be a right majority but rather a moderate coalition government. Therefore, for an extreme
policy to come about, it must be that a majority of voters in a majority of districts prefers
this policy to the moderate coalition policy. This contrasts with single plurality elections
where extreme policy outcomes are always possible, regardless of preferences.
The misaligned voting result stems from the fact that voters condition their ballots on a
wider set of events in my setting. In a standard plurality election, voters condition their vote
on the likelihood of being pivotal in their district. However, in a legislative election, voters
will condition their ballot choice on their vote being pivotal and their district being decisive
in determining the government policy. In many cases a district will be decisive between two
policies, even though there are three candidates. For example, a district might be decisive
in either granting a majority of seats to a non-centrist party, say the left party, or bringing
about a coalition by electing one of the other parties. Under many bargaining rules this
coalition policy will be the same regardless of which of the weaker parties is elected. So,
voters only face a choice between two policies: that of the left party and that of the coalition.
2Misaligned voting is formally defined in subsection 4.2.
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When voters have a choice over two policies there can be no misaligned voting - everyone
must be voting for their preferred option of the two.
One technical contribution of the paper is to extend the Poisson games framework of
Myerson (2000) to a multi-district setting. I show in Lemma 1 that the Magnitude Theorem
and its Corollary can be used to rank the likelihood of various pivotal events across districts.
This greatly reduces the complexity of working with multi-district pivotal events and makes
the problem much more tractable. Proposition 1 uses this feature to show that multiple
(strictly perfect) equilibria always exist. In every equilibrium all districts are duvergerian.
In my benchmark model, parties in the legislature bargain only over policy and do not
discount the future. Here, if no party holds a majority of seats, the moderate party’s policy
will be implemented. While this enormous power of the moderate party may be debatable
in reality, the simplicity of bargaining underlines the novelty of the model’s voting stage.
Two clear predictions emerge from this benchmark model. First, when the moderate party
wins at least one seat, extreme policies outcomes are mitigated: the policy of the left or
right party can only be implemented if a majority of voters in a majority of districts prefer
it to the policy of the moderate party. This result gives us conditions under which a median
voter should prefer a parliamentary or a presidential system. Second, if either the left or
right party is a serious candidate in less than half of the districts, there can be no misaligned
voting. These results change somewhat under different bargaining rules, but their flavour
remains the same. When parties bargain over perks of office as well as policy, the first result
is generally strengthened - it is even more difficult to have extreme outcomes - while the
misaligned voting result is weakened - it can only be ruled out if a non-centrist party is
serious in less than a quarter of districts. When I add discounting to the benchmark model
(in Appendix C), the power of the moderate party is reduced. Nonetheless, an extreme
policy can still only be implemented if it is preferred to a more moderate coalition policy.
Here, misaligned voting cannot generally be eliminated in all districts but may be ruled out
in a large subset of districts.
This paper contributes primarily to the theoretical literature on strategic voting in legisla-
tive elections. The bulk of this work has been on proportional representation. Austen-Smith
and Banks (1988) find that, with a minimum share of votes required to enter the legisla-
ture, the moderate party will receive just enough votes to ensure representation, with the
remainder of its supporters choosing to vote for either the left or right party. Baron and
Diermeier (2001) show that, with two dimensions of policy, either minimal-winning, surplus,
or consensus governments can form depending on the status quo. On plurality legislative
elections Morelli (2004) and Bandyopadhyay, Chatterjee, and Sjo¨stro¨m (2011) show that if
parties can make pre-electoral pacts, and candidate entry is endogenous, then voters will not
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need to act strategically. My paper nonetheless focuses on strategic voting because in the
main countries of interest, the U.K. and Canada, there are generally no pre-electoral pacts
and the three main parties compete in almost every district, so strategic candidacy is not
present.3
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section I introduce the benchmark model
and define an equilibrium. In Section 3, I solve the model and show conditions which must
hold in equilibrium. Section 4 presents the main results on extreme policy outcomes and
misaligned voting in the benchmark model. Section 5 adds perks of office to the bargaining
stage of the model. Section 6 discusses the assumptions of the model and concludes.
2 Model
Parties Three parties; l,m, and r, contest simultaneous elections in D districts, where D is
an odd number. Each district is decided by plurality rule: whichever party receives the most
votes in a district d ∈ D is deemed elected and takes a seat in the legislature.4 This gives a
distribution of seats in the legislature, S ≡ (sl, sm, sr). Each party c ∈ {l,m, r} has a fixed
policy platform ac ∈ [−1, 1], with al < am < ar. Once all the seats in the legislature have
been filled, the parties bargain over the formation of government and implement a policy
z ∈ [−1, 1]. A party’s payoff is −(z− ac)2, i.e. it wants to minimise the distance between its
platform and the final policy.
The benchmark legislative bargaining model I use is that of Baron (1991).5 If a party
has a majority of seats it chooses a policy unilaterally; if no party wins a majority, we enter
a stage of legislative bargaining. First, one party is randomly selected as formateur, where
the probability of each party being chosen is equal to its seat share in the legislature. The
formateur proposes a policy in [−1, 1]. This policy is implemented if a majority of the legisla-
ture support it; if not, a new formateur is selected, under the same random recognition rule,
and the process repeats itself until agreement is reached.6 I assume for now that parties are
3In the 2015 U.K. General Election, the three main parties all contested 631 out of 650 districts (Only
the Conservatives contested seats in Northern Ireland), while in the 2015 Canadian Federal Election the
three major parties contested all 338 seats.
4I abuse notation slightly, letting D be both the number of districts and the set of districts.
5A large literature has grown from legislative bargaining model of Baron and Ferejohn (1989), in which
legislators bargain over the division of a dollar. See Baron (1991), Banks and Duggan (2000), Baron and
Diermeier (2001), Jackson and Moselle (2002), Eraslan, Diermeier, and Merlo (2003), Kalandrakis (2004),
Banks and Duggan (2006), and many others. Morelli (1999) introduces a different approach to legislative
bargaining whereby potential coalition partners make demands to an endogenously chosen formateur. In
contrast with the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) setup, the formateur does not capture a disproportionate share
of the payoffs.
6My results hold whether we a use random recognition rule or a fixed-order rule, another common way
of modelling the bargaining process. Under the fixed order rule, the party with the largest number of seats
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perfectly patient, δ = 1, but this is relaxed in Appendix C. As is standard in the bargaining
literature, I restrict attention to stationary strategies.7 A party’s strategy specifies which
policy to propose if formateur, and which policies to accept or reject otherwise.8
Voters A voter’s type, t ∈ [−1, 1], is simply his position on the policy line; his utility is
ut(z) = −(z − t)2. As such, a voter does not care who wins his district per se, nor does
he care which parties form government. All that matters is the final policy, z, decided in
the legislature. Following Myerson (2000, 2002), the number of voters in each district is not
fully known but rather is a random variable nd, which follows a Poisson distribution and
has mean n.9 Appendix A summarises several properties of the Poisson model. The use of
Poisson games in large election models is now commonplace as it simplifies the calculation
of probabilities while still producing the same predictions as models with fixed but large
populations.10 The actual population of voters in d consists of nd independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) draws from a distribution fd that admits a density and has full support
over the type space [−1, 1].11 The draws in d from fd are independent of the draws in
any other district d′ from fd′ . A voter knows his own type, the distribution from which he
was drawn, and the distribution functions of the other districts, f ≡ (f1, . . . , fd, . . . , fD),
but he does not know the actual distribution of voters that is drawn in any district. Let
V ≡ {vl, vm, vr} be the set of actions an individual can take, with vc indicating a vote for
party c. Voting is costless; thus, there will be no abstention.
A voting strategy is σ : [−1, 1] × D → ∆(V ) where σt,d(vc) is the probability that a
type t voter in district d casts ballot vc.
12 The usual constraints apply: σt,d(vc) ≥ 0,∀c and∑
c
σt,d(vc) = 1,∀(t, d). In a Poisson game, all voters of the same type in the same district
proposes a policy in [−1, 1], which is implemented if a majority of the legislature support it; if not, the
second largest party proposes a policy. If this second policy does not gain majority support, the smallest
party proposes a policy, and if still there is no agreement, a new round of bargaining begins with the largest
party again first to move. See Baron (1991) for more on random and fixed order bargaining rules.
7A party’s strategy is stationary if its continuation strategy is the same at the beginning of any period,
regardless of the history of play.
8More formally, a stationary strategy for party c consists of a proposal yc ∈ [−1, 1] offered any time c is
recognised and a measurable decision rule rc : [−1, 1]→ {accept, reject}.
9The probability that there are exactly k voters in a district is Pr[nd = k] =
e−nnk
k! .
10Krishna and Morgan (2011) use a Poisson model to show that in large elections, voluntary voting
dominates compulsory voting when voting is costly and voters have preferences over ideology and candidate
quality. Bouton and Castanheira (2012) use a Poisson model to show that when a divided majority need to
aggregate information as well as coordinate their voting behaviour, approval voting serves to bring about
the first-best outcome in a large election. Furthermore, Bouton (2013) uses a Poisson model to analyse the
properties of runoff elections.
11Thus the measure of voters who are indifferent between two distinct policies is zero.
12More precisely, the strategy σt,d(vc) is the marginal distribution of Milgrom-Weber distributional strate-
gies (Milgrom and Weber (1985)).
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must follow the same strategy.13 Given the various σt,d’s, the expected vote share of party c
in the district is
τd(c) =
1∫
−1
σt,d(vc)fd(t)dt (1)
which can also be interpreted as the probability of a randomly selected voter playing vc.
The expected distribution of party vote shares in d is τd ≡ (τd(l), τd(m), τd(r)). The realised
profile of votes is xd ≡ (xd(l), xd(m), xd(r)), but this is uncertain ex ante. As the population
of voters is made up of nd independent draws from fd, where E(nd) = n, the expected
number of ballots for candidate c is E(xd(c)|σd) = nτd(c). In the event of a two-way tie, a
coin toss determines the winner, while in a three-way tie each party wins with probability 1
3
.
If nobody votes, I assume that party m wins the seat.14 Let σ ≡ (σ1, . . . , σd, . . . , σD) denote
the profile of voter strategies across districts and let σ−d be that profile with σd omitted.
Let τ ≡ (τ1, . . . , τd, . . . , τD) denote the profile of expected party vote share distributions and
let τ−d be that profile with τd omitted. Thus, we have τ (σ, f).
Pivotality, Decisiveness and Payoffs A single vote is pivotal if it makes or breaks a tie
for first place in the district. A district is decisive if the policy outcome z depends on which
candidate that district elects. When deciding on his strategy, a voter need only consider
cases in which his vote affects the policy outcome. Therefore, he will condition his vote
choice on being pivotal in his district and on the district being decisive.
Let pivd(c, c
′) denote when, in district d, a vote for party c′ is pivotal against c. This
occurs when xd(c) = xd(c
′) ≥ xd(c′′) – so that an extra vote for c′ means it wins the seat –
or when xd(c) = xd(c
′) + 1 ≥ xd(c′′) – so that an extra vote for c′ forces a tie. Let λd denote
an event in which district d is decisive in determining which policy z is implemented; and
let λid denote the i-th most likely decisive event for district d. Here the decision of district
d will lead to one of three final policy outcomes, thus, we can write each decisive event as
λid(z
i) or λid(z
i
l , z
i
m, z
i
r) where each z
i
c is the policy outcome of the legislative bargaining stage
when the decisive district elects party c. Note that these policies need not correspond to the
announced platforms of the parties - typically coalition bargaining will lead to compromised
policies. Two decisive events λid and λ
j
d are distinct if (z
i
l , z
i
m, z
i
r) 6= (zjl , zjm, zjr). Let Λ be
the set of all decisive events in which each element in the set is distinct from every other
element in the set15; this set consists of I elements. As we will see, the number and type of
13This stems from the very nature of population uncertainty. See Myerson (1998)) pg. 377 for more
detail.
14The probability of zero turnout in a district is e−n.
15That is, for any two elements λid and λ
j
d in the set Λ, we have (z
i
l , z
i
m, z
i
r) 6= (zjl , zjm, zjr).
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decisive events in the set Λ depends on the legislative bargaining rule used.
It is useful for the following sections to classify decisive events into three categories. Let
λ(3) be a decisive event where all three policies zil , z
i
m, and z
i
r are different points on the
policy line; let λ(2) be a case where two of the three policies are identical.16 Finally, let λ(2′)
be an event where there are three different policies but one of them is the preferred choice
of no voter.17 We can now turn to voter payoffs.
Let Gt,d(vc|nτ ) denote the expected gain for a voter of type t in district d of voting for
party c, given the strategies of all other players in the game – this includes players in his
own district as well as those in the other D − 1 districts. The expected gain of voting vl is
given by
Gt,d(vl|nτ ) =
I∑
i=1
Pr[λid]
(
Pr[pivd(m, l)]
(
ut(z
i
l )− ut(zim)
)
+ Pr[pivd(r, l)]
(
ut(z
i
l )− ut(zir)
))
(2)
with the gain of voting vm and vr similarly defined. The probability of being pivotal between
two candidates, Pr[pivd(c, c
′)], depends on the strategies and distribution of player types in
that district, summarised by τd, while the probability of district d being decisive depends
on the strategies and distributions of player types in the other D − 1 districts, τ−d. The
best response correspondence of a type t in district d to a strategy profile and distribution
of types given by τ is
BRt,d(nτ ) ≡ argmax
σt,d
∑
vc∈V
σt,d(vc)Gt,d(vc|nτ ) (3)
Equilibrium Concept The equilibrium of this game consists of a voting equilibrium and a
bargaining equilibrium. In a bargaining equilibrium, each party’s strategy is a best response to
the strategies of the other two parties. I restrict attention to stationary bargaining equilibria,
as is standard in such games.18
As we are interested in the properties of large national elections, at the voting stage I will
analyse asymptotic equilibria.19 That is, the limit of the set of equilibria as n → ∞. More
specifically, following Bouton and Gratton (2015), I restrict attention to asymptotic strictly
16Obviously, λ(1) events cannot exist; if electing any of the three parties gives the same policy, it is not
a decisive event.
17For this to be the case, the universally disliked policy must be a lottery over two or more policies.
18An equilibrium is stationary if it is a subgame perfect equilibrium and each party’s strategy is the same
at the beginning of each bargaining period, regardless of the history of play.
19Let Γˆ ≡ {Γn}n→∞ be a sequence of games. A strategy profile σ∗ is an asymptotic equilibrium of Γˆ if
there exists a sequence of Nash equilibria {σ∗n}n→∞ of Γn such that σ∗t,d,n → σ∗t,d for almost all t in every d.
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perfect equilibria.20 A sequence of Nash equilibria {σ∗n}n→∞ is asymptotically strictly perfect
if (i) it admits a limit and (ii) as n grows large, Pr[t ∈ [−1, 1] : σ∗t,d /∈ BRt,d(nτ˜ n)] → 0
in every district for any τ˜ n sufficiently close to τ (σ
∗
n, f).
21 That is, the equilibrium must
be robust to epsilon changes in the strategies of players. Bouton and Gratton (2015) argue
that restricting attention to such equilibria in multi-candidate Poisson games is appropriate
because it rules out unstable and undesirable equilibria identified by Fey (1997). If, instead,
Bayesian Nash equilibrium is used there may be knife-edge equilibria in which voters expect
two or more candidates to get exactly the same number of votes. Bouton and Gratton (2015)
also note that requiring strict perfection is equivalent to robustness to heterogenous beliefs
about the distribution of preferences.
3 Equilibrium
Bargaining Equilibrium The following proposition shows the policy outcome of legisla-
tive bargaining for any distribution of seats.
Proposition 0 (Jackson and Moselle (2002)). The equilibrium policy outcome of the legisla-
tive bargaining stage is
z =

al if sl >
D−1
2
ar if sr >
D−1
2
am otherwise
(4)
When no party has a majority of seats and δ = 1, in any stationary bargaining equilibrium
z = am is proposed and eventually passed with probability one.
22 To see this, note that if
any other policy is proposed, a majority of legislators will find it worthwhile to wait until
am is offered (which will occur when party m is eventually chosen as formateur). The result
is regardless of whether the protocol is fixed order or random.
Every feasible seat distribution is mapped into a policy outcome, so, voters can fully
anticipate which policy will arise from a given seat distribution. The set of distinct decisive
events is given by
Λ = {λ(al, am, am), λ(am, am, ar), λ(al, am, ar)} (5)
20The original formulation of strictly perfect equilibrium was for games with a finite number of players;
Bouton and Gratton (2015) in their Appendix C extend this to Poisson games and define its asymptotic
version.
21More formally, An asymptotic equilibrium σ∗ is asymptotically strictly perfect if there exists a sequence
of Nash equilibria {σ∗n} → σ∗ such that for any δ > 0 there exist N ∈ N and  > 0 such that for any n > N ,
if ∀τ˜d ∈ ∆V : |τ˜d − τd(σ∗, f)| < , then Pr[t ∈ [−1, 1] : σ∗t,d ∈ BRt,d(nτ˜ )] < δ for almost all t ∈ [−1, 1].
22For a discussion see Baron (1991) and for a proof see Jackson and Moselle (2002).
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These cases correspond to when party l is one seat short of a majority, party r is one
seat short of a majority, and when both parties l and r are one seat short of a majority
respectively.23
Voting Equilibrium A slight detour on how voters optimally cast their vote is in order
before describing the voting equilibrium. The results derived in this subsection do not rely
on the specific bargaining protocol and party preferences. I shall use this fact later in Section
5. We know from the Magnitude Theorem (Myerson (2000), see Appendix A) that as n→∞
voters in a single district election need only condition their choice on the most likely vote
profile in which their vote is pivotal. The following lemma extends this result to the case of
multi-district elections considered here.
Lemma 1. As n→∞, if there is a unique most likely event in which his vote is both pivotal
and decisive over two distinct policy outcomes z and z′, then a voter who is not indifferent
between z and z′ need only condition his choice on this single event.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Indifferent voters are of measure zero, so can safely be ignored. The lemma greatly
simplifies the decision process for a voter - he can ignore all but the most likely (i.e. largest
magnitude) case in which his vote is pivotal and decisive. This is because as the size of
the electorate increases, the overall probability of being pivotal and decisive goes to zero
but, conditional on being pivotal and decisive, almost all the probability falls on the most
likely event in that set of events. The lemma states that this is the case if there is a unique
pivotal and decisive event with largest magnitude. However, we might worry that more than
one event has the largest magnitude. The proof of Proposition 1 below shows that in any
asymptotic strictly perfect equilibrium, the pivotal and decisive event with largest magnitude
is unique. This uniqueness ensures that districts are duvergerian.
Proposition 1. For any majoritarian legislative bargaining rule and any distribution of
voter preferences, f ≡ (f1, . . . , fd, . . . , fD), there are multiple equilibria; in every equilibrium
districts are duvergerian.
Proof. See Appendix B.
It is perhaps unsurprising that there are multiple equilibria and districts are always
duvergerian, especially given the findings of the extensive literature on single district plurality
elections. The logic as to why races are duvergerian is similar to the single district case; voters
23The final case can only occur when party m has no seats.
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condition their ballot choice on the most likely case in which they are pivotal, decisive and not
indifferent over outcomes. This greatly simplifies the decision process of voters and means
they need only consider the two frontrunners in their district.24 The following corollary and
the properties which follow it will be useful for the analysis in the remainder of the paper.
Corollary to Proposition 1. For any majoritarian legislative bargaining rule and any
distribution of voter preferences, there always exists an equilibrium in which party m wins
at least one seat in the legislature.
Proof. See Appendix B.
While we cannot pin down which equilibrium will be played, the following properties will
always hold.
1. In each district only two candidates receive votes; call these serious candidates.
2. If τd(c) > τd(c
′) > τd(c′′) = 0, candidate c is the expected winner and his probability
of winning goes to one as n→∞. Let dc denote such a district and let Dc be the set
of districts with c as the expected winner.
3. The expected seat distribution is E(S) = E(sl, sm, sr) = (#Dl,#Dm,#Dr).
4. A district with c and c′ as serious candidates will condition on the most likely decisive
event λi ∈ Λ such that zic 6= zic′ .
The fourth property says: if a district’s most likely decisive event, λ1d, is of type λ(3) or
λ(2′), then voters must be conditioning on this event; if λ1d is of type λ(2), voters will be
conditioning on it only if they are not indifferent between the two serious candidates.
4 Analysis of Benchmark Model
4.1 Extreme Policy Outcomes
The model sustains multiple equilibria for any distribution of preferences. In some of
these equilibria, the moderate party m wins no seats. Nonetheless, the available empirical
evidence suggests that a moderate party almost always wins at least one seat. In UK
and Canadian elections over the past hundred years this has always been the case.25 These
24By restricting attention to strictly perfect equilibria we rule out knife edge cases where candidates are
expected to get exactly the same share of votes.
25Possible reasons might be that the moderate party has historically been a serious candidate in a given
district or perhaps it has many non-strategic supporters there.
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examples suggests that it might be of greater practical importance to focus on equilibria that
feature this characteristic. In this sub-section, I focus on equilibria in which the moderate
party always wins a seat. Notice that by the Corollary to Proposition 1 this does not restrict
the set of elections I consider.
Much attention in the U.S. has focused on how a system with two polarised parties has led
to policies which are far away from the median voter’s preferred point.26 An open question is
the degree to which policy outcomes reflect the preferences of voters in a legislative election
with three parties. Let t˜d be the expected position of the median voter in district d, and
order the districts so that t˜1 < . . . < t˜D+1
2
< . . . < t˜D. Then, t˜D+1
2
is the expected median
voter in the median district. Furthermore, let alm ≡ al+am2 and amr ≡ am+ar2 . While extreme
outcomes can always occur in stand-alone multi-candidate plurality elections, the proposition
below gives a sufficient condition for the policy outcome to be the platform of the moderate
party, am.
Proposition 2. In any equilibrium in which the moderate party is expected to win at least
one seat, if
alm < t˜D+1
2
< amr
then the expected outcome is the moderate party’s platform am.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The proposition stands in stark contrast to single district plurality elections. In a stand-
alone plurality election it can always be that l and r are the serious candidates, so either al
or ar will be implemented. In a legislative election it takes much more to get non-moderate
policies. For example, for al to come about it must be that (a) voters act as if their vote is
pivotal in deciding between an l majority government and a coalition, and (b) a majority of
voters in a majority of districts prefer policy al to the coalition policy, am.
This result gives a novel insight into multiparty legislative elections under plurality. In
the U.K., until recently, a vote for the centrist Liberal Democrats (Lib Dems) has typically
been considered a “wasted vote”.27 The popular belief was that the Lib Dems were not a
legitimate contender for government and so, even if they took a number of seats in parliament,
they would not influence policy. As a result, centrist voters instead voted for either the
Conservatives (right-wing) or Labour (left-wing).28 My model shows that electing a Lib
26See McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2008) as well as Polborn and Krasa (2015).
27See “What Future for the Liberal Democrats” by Lord Ashcroft, 2010.
28My assumption that the Lib Dems are the centrist party is supported by polling data. Since 2006
YouGov have asked survey respondents to place the three main parties on a policy line. The Lib Dems have
always been named as the centrist party. See https://yougov.co.uk/news/2014/07/23/britains-changing-
political-spectrum
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Dem candidate is far from a waste. Electing just one member of the Lib Dems to the
legislature will be enough to moderate extreme policies unless voter preferences favour one
of the non-centrist parties very much. In this benchmark case moderation leads to any
coalition implementing Lib Dem policies in full. In Section 5 and Appendix C we’ll see
that a coalition doesn’t implement the exact policy of the moderate party - nonetheless,
coalition policies remain quite centrist and extreme outcomes are still mitigated. This result
suggests that concerns about the average voter not being adequately represented in the U.K.
or Canada are misplaced. If the Conservatives win a majority in parliament it must be
that a majority of voters in a majority of districts prefer their policy to that of a moderate
coalition. On the other hand, a moderate coalition can come about for any distribution
of voter preferences.29 Supporters of centrist parties - the Lib Dems in the U.K. and the
Liberals in Canada - are therefore hugely advantaged by the current electoral system; it is
the supporters of the non-centrist parties who are disadvantaged.
There are two concerns one might have about the proposition. The first is that is it
phrased in terms of expected outcomes. The focus on expected policies and voters is because
of the random nature of the model. It is always possible for the realised population of voters
to differ from the expected population sufficiently that E(z) 6= z. However, as n → ∞ this
probability goes to zero. The second concern is that it places a condition on the expected
number of seats the moderate party wins, an endogenous variable. It is always possible that
l and r are the serious candidates in every district, m wins no seats, and the final policy is
extreme. These types of multiple equilibria are ever-present in voting games. However, even
if E(sm) = 0, the proposition still holds so long as m is a serious candidate in one relatively
“close” district.30
The median voter in the median district, t˜D+1
2
, is not the same as the median voter in
the overall population, t˜med. By definition t˜med is the individual at the 50th percentile of the
whole population distribution over [-1,1]. The “median of medians”, t˜D+1
2
, instead will be
somewhere between the 25th and 75th percentiles.31 Where exactly t˜D+1
2
is in the interval
depends on f .32 Thus, we can have t˜D+1
2
< t˜med or t˜D+1
2
≥ t˜med. The following proposition
29For any f , there are always equilibria where z = am is the expected outcome. If support is strong
for party r then an equilibrium in which districts focus on a λ(al, am, am) decisive event will give z = am.
Likewise, if l is popular then a focus on λ(am, am, ar) will give z = am.
30E(sm) > 0 is a sufficient but not necessary condition for the proposition to hold. As can be seen in the
proof of the proposition, all that is required is that Kdl(λ(al, am, am)) - the sequence of pivotal events with
largest magnitude resulting in λdl = λ(al, am, am) - is a subset of Kdl(λ(al, am, ar)).
31More specifically the lower and upper bounds are the (D+1)25D and
(3D−1)25
D percentiles. These bounds
converge to the 25th and 75th percentiles as the number of districts increases.
32The lower bound is the case where f such that the bottom quartile of voter types are all situated in
the same D + 1 districts, and within each of those districts these types are just barely in the majority. The
upper bound corresponds to a f ′ where the bottom three quartiles of voter types make up 100% of voters in
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gives conditions under which t˜med would be better off under a legislative election or single
district election. This is equivalent to asking whether the median voter would be better off
under a parliamentary or presidential system.
Proposition 3. In any equilibrium in which the moderate party is expected to win at least
one seat, we have the following:
1. If t˜D+1
2
, t˜med ∈ (alm, amr), the utility of t˜med is weakly higher in a legislative election
than in a single district election.
2. If t˜med < alm < t˜D+1
2
or if t˜D+1
2
< amr < t˜med, the utility of t˜med is weakly higher in a
single district election than in a legislative election.
3. In all other cases t˜med may be better off under single district or legislative elections
depending on which equilibrium is played.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The proposition can give us insights into when we should have a parliamentary or a
presidential system. In countries where the median voter and the “median of medians”
are both relatively moderate, a parliamentary system does a better job of representing the
median voter. In countries where the median voter is extreme in one direction while the
“median of medians” is either moderate or extreme in the other direction, then a presidential
system would be better for the median voter. The reason is that legislative elections produce
more moderate policy outcomes. This is desirable if the median voter is also moderate, but
may not be best if he is extreme.
4.2 Misaligned Voting
When deciding which candidate to vote for, a voter must first consider (a) how the
election of each candidate would map into his utility - so as to come up with a ranking over
ballots - and then (b) whether to vote for his top-ranked alternative. This is true both in
stand-alone district elections and in legislative elections. In stand-alone district elections
(a) is simple - if party c is elected, policy ac is implemented - it doesn’t depend on the
strategies of other players. In a legislative election (a) is more complicated. Here, a voter’s
preference over candidates in d depends on which candidates win the other D − 1 districts
(because this determines the policy outcome of legislative bargaining). That is, preferences
over ballots depend on the strategies of voters in other districts. While the calculation of
D − 1 districts, and in each of the remaining D + 1 districts they are just barely in the minority.
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(a) differs in stand-alone and legislative elections, in both cases voters still face (b): whether
to vote for their top-ranked alternative or not. A voter in d casts a misaligned vote (see
Kawai and Watanabe (2013)) if he does not vote for his top-ranked alternative. Of course,
in a legislative election, what constitutes a voter’s top-ranked alternative will depend on the
equilibrium played. More formally,
Definition. An equilibrium with voting strategies σ∗ exhibits misaligned voting in district
d if there exists a voter type (t, d) and parties c and c′ such that σ∗t,d(vc) = 1 and a victory in
district d for party c′ would give voters with type (t, d) a higher continuation expected payoff
than a victory of party c.
If a voter casts a misaligned vote, he is essentially giving up on his preferred candidate
due to Duverger’s law. In a stand-alone district election, the decision on whether to vote
for his top-ranked candidate depends on whether that candidate is serious or not. With
candidates l,m and r, whichever candidate is least likely to be pivotal will be abandoned
by his supporters, leading to a two-party race. Every equilibrium will exhibit misaligned
voting, either all types with t < alm, all types with t > amr, or those in the interval between
will cast a misaligned vote. In a legislative election, a voter’s preference within a district
depends upon what he expects to happen nationally. Only by conditioning on the most
likely decisive events can he know which local candidate he prefers. The decision on whether
to vote for this top-ranked alternative is determined, as in the stand-alone case, by which
are the serious candidates in the district. Nonetheless, Proposition 4 below shows that there
are many equilibria of the legislative election in which there is no misaligned voting in any
district.
Proposition 4. For any distribution of voter preferences, there always exist equilibria that
do not exhibit misaligned voting in any district. In any such equilibrium, either l or r is a
serious candidate in fewer than D−1
2
districts.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The proposition can be understood as follows: A voter with t > alm conditioning on a
λ(al, am, am) event will vote for whichever of m or r is serious in his district. However, his
vote will be misaligned unless he is voting for his preferred alternative. For m and r to
both be his preferred alternative he must be indifferent between them in all possible decisive
events. He would not be indifferent in λ(am, am, ar) or λ(al, am, ar) events, for example. If
party r is serious in fewer than D−1
2
districts then only λ(al, am, am) events exist, which in
turn means voters with t > alm are indifferent between m and r. Voters with t < alm are
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not misaligned either - they simply vote for their preferred candidate, l. As we will see, this
result is a special case of Proposition 7, where λ1 is a λ(2) event and no λ2 event exists.
The caveat to Proposition 2 also applies here. That is, there always exist equilibria where
party l or r is serious in more than half the districts. Nonetheless, the proposition gives us
a clear prediction on when there will and will not be misaligned voting with three parties
competing in a legislative election. It shows that the conventional wisdom - no misaligned
with two candidates, always misaligned with three - is wide of the mark; whether there is
misaligned voting or not depends on the strength of the non-centrist parties.
The proposition also has implications for the study of third-party entry into a two-party
system. Suppose, as is plausible, that a newly formed party cannot become focal in many
districts - maybe because they have limited resources, or because voters do not yet consider
them a serious alternative. Either way, an entering third-party is likely to be weaker than
the two established parties. Proposition 4 tells us that if a third party enters on the flanks
of the two established parties, then there will be no misaligned voting and no effect on the
policy outcome as long as this party is serious in fewer than half the districts. On the other
hand, if a third party enters at a policy point in between the two established parties, this
can shake up the political landscape. First of all, there will necessarily be misaligned voting.
Second of all, the policy outcome will now depend on which equilibrium voters focus on
- either al or am if t˜D+1
2
< alr and am or ar if t˜D+1
2
> alr. Success for the new party in
just one district can radically change the policy outcome. The implication is that parties
in a two-party system should be less concerned about the entry of fringe parties and more
concerned about potential centrist parties stealing the middle ground.
5 Legislative Bargaining over Policy and Perks
While the model of bargaining over policy in the previous section is tractable, it lacks
one of the key features of the government formation process: parties often bargain over perks
of office such as ministerial positions as well as over policy. Here, as parties can trade off
losses in the policy dimension for gains in the perks dimension, and vice versa, a larger set
of policy outcomes are possible. This section will show that, nonetheless, the results of the
benchmark model extend broadly to the case of bargaining over policy and perks.
The following legislative bargain model is due to Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) (hench-
forth ASB).33 The party winning the most seats of the three begins the process by offering
a policy outcome y1 ∈ [−1, 1] and a distribution of a fixed amount of transferable private
33Other papers with bargaining over policy and perks include Diermeier and Merlo (2000) and Bandy-
opadhyay and Oak (2008).
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benefits across the parties, b1 = (b1l , b
1
m, b
1
r) ∈ [0, B]3. It is assumed that B is large enough
so that any possible governments can form, i.e. l can offer enough benefits to party r so as
to overcome their ideological differences.34 If the first proposal is rejected, the party with
the second largest number of seats gets to propose (y2, b2). If this is rejected, the smallest
party proposes (y3, b3). If no agreement has been reached after the third period, a caretaker
government implements (y0, b0), which gives zero utility to all parties.35
At its turn to make a proposal, party c solves
max
bc′ ,y
B − bc′ − (y − ac)2 (6)
subject to bc′ − (y − ac′)2 ≥ Wc′
where Wc′ is the continuation value of party c
′ and Wc′′+(y−ac′′)2 > Wc′+(y−ac′)2, so that
the formateur makes the offer to whichever party is cheaper. Solving the game by backward
induction, Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) show that a coalition government will always be
made up of the largest party and the smallest party.36 They solve for the equilibrium policy
outcome, for any possible distance between al, am and ar.
Table 1 shows the policy outcome for each seat distribution and distance between parties,
where ∆l ≡ am−al and ∆r ≡ ar−am. I assume if two parties have exactly the same number
of seats, a coin is tossed before the bargaining game begins to decide the order of play. So,
if sl = sr > sm, then with probability one-half, the game will play out as when sl > sr > sm
and otherwise as sr > sl > sm. The set of possible policy outcomes depends on the number
of seats in the legislature, and on the distance between party policies. While there are many
more decisive cases than when B = 0, they can be grouped into the three categories defined
previously: λ(2), λ(2′) and λ(3) events.
Seat Share 3∆r < ∆l 2∆r < ∆l ≤ 3∆r ∆r < ∆l ≤ 2∆r ∆l = ∆r ∆l < ∆r ≤ 2∆l 2∆l < ∆r ≤ 3∆l 3∆l < ∆r
sl > (D − 1)/2 al al al al al al al
(D + 1)/2 > sl > sr > sm alm alm alm alm alm 2am − alr al
(D + 1)/2 > sl > sm > sr alr alr alr am am am am
sm > sl, sr am am am am am am am
(D + 1)/2 > sr > sm > sl am am am am alr alr alr
(D + 1)/2 > sr > sl > sm ar 2am − alr amr amr amr amr amr
sr > (D − 1)/2 ar ar ar ar ar ar ar
Table 1: Policy outcomes under ASB bargaining for any seat distribution and distance
between parties.
34This is the assumption made in the literature and in the original Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) paper.
If B is not large enough then a coalition could never form without m, so we would return to the benchmark
model.
35This three-period protocol is a departure from the infinite horizon of the other bargaining rules I use.
Nonetheless, it is the standard ASB model and so is used for easy comparisons to the literature.
36Unless of course one party has a majority of seats, in which case it implements ac and keeps all of B.
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The following proposition shows that, even when parties can bargain over perks as well
as policy, a non-centrist party will only win a majority if the median voter in the median
district prefers its policy to that of the centrist party.
Proposition 5. In any equilibrium under ASB bargaining in which the moderate party is
expected to win at least one seat:
1. If 3∆l > ∆r, then the expected policy can be al only if t˜D+1
2
< alm.
2. If 3∆r > ∆l, then the expected policy can be ar only if t˜D+1
2
> amr.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The conditions on ∆l and ∆l above are simply to rule out cases where party platforms al
and ar are exceptionally asymmetrically positioned vis-a-vis am. Given that restriction, we
reaffirm the result of Proposition 2, that moderate coalitions will be the norm in legislative
elections unless the population is heavily biased in favour of one of the non-centrist parties.
Moreover, bargaining over perks and policy can make it even more difficult for a non-centrist
party to gain a majority than in the benchmark case. Using the same steps as in the proof,
one can show that if E(sl) >
D−1
2
, E(sm) > 1 and
D−1
4
< E(sr) <
D−1
2
, the most likely
decisive event for each district must be λ(al, alm, alm). Therefore, a party l majority could
only come about if t˜D+1
2
< al+alm
2
- an even stricter requirement than that of the benchmark
case. This result is noteworthy as in U.K. and Canadian elections party seat shares have
tended to be in line with this case: one of the non-centrist parties wins a majority, the other
wins more than a quarter of the seats, while the centrist party wins much less than a quarter.
I do not carry out the welfare comparisons of Proposition 3 for this protocol. Here there
are many more potential policy outcomes and many more decisive events, making welfare
comparison intractable.
On the other dimension of interest bargaining over policy and perks does not perform as
well; the restrictions needed to completely rule out misaligned voting are more severe than
in the benchmark model. However, as Proposition 7 will show, there are many equilibria in
which a large subset of districts have no misaligned voting.
Proposition 6. For any distribution of preferences, under ASB bargaining, there always
exist equilibria that do not exhibit misaligned voting in any district.
1. When ∆l = ∆r, there is no misaligned voting if either l or r is a serious candidate in
fewer than D−1
4
districts.
2. When ∆l < ∆r, there is no misaligned voting if r is a serious candidate in fewer than
D−1
4
districts.
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3. When ∆l > ∆r, there is no misaligned voting if l is a serious candidate in fewer than
D−1
4
districts.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The intuition is the same as in Proposition 4: when a non-centrist party is not serious in
enough districts, there is no hope of it influencing the outcome of legislative bargaining. The
threshold for relevance is lower than in the benchmark case. This is because the order of
parties matters for the policy outcome under ASB bargaining. Once it is possible for party
r to win D−1
4
districts, two distinct decisive events exist: λ(al, am, am) and λ(al, am, alm). No
matter which of these two events a district focuses on, and which two candidates are serious,
some voters in the district will be casting misaligned votes.
When party l or r have serious candidates in more than D−1
4
districts we cannot rule
out misaligned voting. This should not be surprising in a model with three differentiated
parties and multiple voter types on a policy line. We know that in single plurality elections
there will always be misaligned voting. What is surprising is that misaligned voting can
ever be ruled out in a district. The following proposition gives conditions for equilibria with
no misaligned voting in a subset of districts. The result is general and not specific to the
bargaining rules examined in this paper. That is, if either of the two conditions hold for a
given bargaining rule, then there will be no misaligned voting in that district.
Proposition 7. There will be no misaligned voting in a district if either
1. The most likely decisive event λ1d is a λ(2
′) event where candidates c and c′ are serious
and z1c′′ is preferred by no voter.
2. The most likely decisive event λ1d is a λ(2) event where candidates c and c
′ are serious,
z1c = z
1
c′′, and all those voting vc must have ut(z
i
c) > ut(z
i
c′′) in the next most likely
decisive event λi ∈ Λ in which zic 6= zic′′.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The proposition is best understood by way of example. To see the first part, take a
λ(2′) event, for example, S−d = (D−32 , 2,
D−3
2
). Electing l will give sl > sr > sm resulting in
z = alm, electing r instead will give sr > sl > sm and bring about z = amr, while electing
m will lead to a tie for first place between l and r. A coin toss will decide which of the two
policies comes about, but ex ante voters’ expectation is E(alm, amr). As voters have concave
utility functions, every voter strictly prefers either alm or amr to the lottery over the pair.
If this decisive event is the most likely (i.e. infinitely more likely than all others) and the
district focuses on a race between l and r, nobody in the district is casting a misaligned vote.
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To see the second part of the proposition, suppose the most likely decisive event is
S−d = (D−32 , 3,
D−5
2
). Here, electing l or m gives alm while electing r brings about a coin toss
and an expected policy E(alm, amr). Suppose further that the second most likely decisive
event is S−d = (D−52 , 3,
D−3
2
), where electing m or r gives policy amr while electing l gives
E(alm, amr). In the most likely event, all voters below a certain threshold will be indifferent
between electing l and electing m. However, in the second most likely decisive event, all
of these voters would prefer to elect l than m. Given that each decisive event is infinitely
more likely to occur than a less likely decisive event, these voters need only consider the
top two decisive events. Any voter who is indifferent between l and m in the most likely
decisive event strictly prefers l in the second most likely. So, if the district focuses on a race
between l and r there will be no misaligned voting. A special case of this second condition
is when λ1 is a λ(2) event and no λ2 event exists. This is what rules out misaligned voting
in Proposition 4 and Proposition 6.
Proposition 7 is quite useful, as it holds for any bargaining rule. It allows me to show in
Appendix C that, even though we cannot get results such as Proposition 4 and Proposition 6,
we do not return to the stand-alone election case of “always misaligned voting”. Instead,
there are again many equilibria in which a subset of districts have no misaligned voting.
6 Discussion
In this paper, I introduced and analysed a model of three-party competition in legislative
elections under plurality rule. I showed that two properties of plurality rule - extreme policy
outcomes and misaligned voting - are significantly reduced when the rule is used to elect a
legislature. The degree to which these phenomena are reduced depends on the institutional
setup - specifically, on how legislative bargaining occurs - but overall the results show that a
plurality rule legislative electoral system reflects voter preferences much more than a single
district model would suggest.
In the benchmark model, parties are perfectly patient and bargain only over policy. Two
clear results emerged from this model. First, while an extreme policy can always come about
in standard plurality elections, in my setting a non-centrist policy needs broad support in
the electorate in order to be implemented; specifically, a majority of voters in a majority
of districts must prefer the extreme policy to the moderate party’s policy. Second, while
standard plurality elections with three distinct choices always exhibit misaligned voting, in
my benchmark model this is the case only if each non-centrist party is a serious candidate
in more than half the districts - otherwise there is no misaligned voting in any district.
The results of the benchmark model largely hold up under the other bargaining rules
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considered: the non-centrist parties cannot win for any voter preferences (unlike in standard
plurality elections), and there are always equilibria in which there is no misaligned voting
(at least in a subset of districts).
In a 2011 referendum UK voters were asked to choose between plurality rule and Instant
Run-off Voting (IRV) as a means of electing parliament.37,38 Supporters of IRV campaigned
by appealing to the undesirable properties of plurality rule; claiming plurality protected
a two party system of the non-centrist Conservative and Labour parties while the votes of
millions of centrist voters were wasted. This paper shows that applying what we know about
single district elections to legislative elections can lead to wrong conclusions. If we really
want to know whether plurality is outperformed by IRV (or proportional representation for
that matter) as an electoral system then we need to analyse the full legislative election game.
Such a comparison between systems is beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future
work.
In the remainder of this section I discuss the robustness of my modelling assumptions.
First, if utility functions are concave rather than specifically quadratic, the benchmark model
is unchanged. When bargaining also involves perks, the same is true as long as there are
enough perks to allow a coalition between the left and right parties to form.39 Second, if
parties bargain by making demands rather than offers, as in Morelli (1999), the results will
be the same as in the benchmark model.40 Third, if instead of a Poisson model I assumed a
fixed population size drawn from a multinomial distribution, the results of my model would
still go through.41
A key assumption is that voters only care about the policy implemented in the legislature.
If they also have preferences over who wins their local district, the results of the model no
longer hold: the probability of being pivotal locally would outweigh any possible utility gain
at the national level so that voters would only consider the local dimension. However, in
Westminster systems, a Member of Parliament has no power to implement policy at a local
level; he merely serves as an agent of his constituents: bringing up local issues in parliament,
37In the referendum, UK Voters decided to retain plurality rule.
38IRV is used to elect the Australian Parliament. Under IRV voters rank the candidates in their district
on the ballot paper. If no candidate receives more than 50% of first preferences, those with the least first
preference votes are eliminated and their second preferences are distributed to the remaining candidates.
This continues until one candidate passes the 50% threshold and is elected.
39If the perks are not large enough or parties don’t value perks enough, a coalition will always involve
the moderate party and we return to the simpler bargaining over policy case.
40Whenever there is no clear majority, the head of state selects party m as the first mover, so the coalition
policy will be z = am.
41Myerson (2000) shows that the magnitude of an event with a multinomial distribution is a simple
transformation of its magnitude with a Poisson distribution. This transformation preserves the ordering of
events and so this means that the ordering of sets of pivotal and decisive events in my model would remain
unchanged, and therefore so would the equilibria.
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helping constituents with housing authority claims, etc. So, if voters do have preferences
over their local winner, it should only be on a common-value, valence dimension. If this were
indeed the case, party policies would be irrelevant for how voters cast their ballots.
Finally, the assumption of perfect information is unrealistic in a real world election. The
asymptotic elements of the model mean voters can perfectly rank the probabilities of certain
events. In real life we are never that confident: polls may not be accurate, or more often,
polls may not exist at the district level. Myatt (2007) and Fisher and Myatt (2014) have
analysed single plurality elections with aggregate uncertainty over voters’ intentions. While
this paper abstracts from aggregate uncertainty for the sake of comparison with standard
models, including greater uncertainty in a multi-district model is an important path for
future research.
Appendix A: Poisson Properties
The number of voters in a district is a Poisson random variable nd with mean n. The
probability of having exactly k voters is Pr[nd = k] =
e−nnk
k!
. Poisson Voting games exhibit
some useful properties. By environmental equivalence, from the perspective of a player in
the game, the number of other players is also a Poisson random variable nd with mean n.
By the decomposition property, the number of voters with type in the subset T ⊂ [−1, 1] is
Poisson distributed with mean
∫
t∈T nfd(t)dt, and is independent of the number of players
with types in any other disjoint sets.
The probability of a vote profile xd = (xd(l), xd(m), xd(r)) given voter strategies is
Pr[xd|nτd] =
∏
c∈{l,m,r}
e−nτd(c)(nτd(c))xd(c)
xd(c)!
(7)
Its associated magnitude is
µ(xd) ≡ lim
n→∞
log(Pr[xd|nτd])
n
= lim
n→∞
∑
c∈{l,m,r}
τd(c)ψ
(
xd(c)
nτd(c)
)
(8)
where ψ(θ) = θ(1− log(θ))− 1.
Magnitude Theorem Let an event Ad be a subset of all possible vote profiles in district
d. The magnitude theorem (Myerson (2000)) states that for a large population of size n, the
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magnitude of an event, µ(Ad), is:
µ(Ad) ≡ lim
n→∞
log(Pr[Ad])
n
= lim
n→∞
max
xd∈Ad
∑
c∈{l,m,r}
τd(c)ψ
(
xd(c)
nτd(c)
)
(9)
where ψ(θ) = θ(1− log(θ))− 1. That is, as n→∞, the magnitude of an event Ad is simply
the magnitude of the most likely vote profile xd ∈ Ad. The magnitude µ(Ad) ∈ [−1, 0]
represents the speed at which the probability of the event goes to zero as n→∞; the more
negative its magnitude, the faster that event’s probability converges to zero.
Corollary to the Magnitude Theorem If two events Ad and A
′
d have µ(Ad) > µ(A
′
d),
then their probability ratio converges to zero as n→∞.
µ(A′d) < µ(Ad)⇒ lim
n→∞
Pr[A′d]
Pr[Ad]
= 0 (10)
It is possible that two distinct events have the same magnitude. In this case, we must use
the offset theorem to compare their relative probabilities.
Offset Theorem Take two distinct events, Ad 6= A′d with the same magnitude, then
µ(Ad) = µ(A
′
d)⇒ lim
n→∞
Pr[Ad]
Pr[A′d]
= φ 0 < φ <∞ (11)
Suppose we have τd(c1) > τd(c2) > τd(c3), so that the subscript denotes a party’s expected
ranking in terms of vote share. Maximising Equation 9 subject to the appropriate constraints
we get
µ(piv(i, j)) = µ(piv(j, i)) ∀i, j ∈ C (12)
µ(c1-win) = 0
µ(c2-win) = µ(piv(c1, c2)) = 2
√
τd(c1)τd(c2)− 1 + τd(c3)
µ(c3-win) = µ(piv(c2, c3)) = µ(piv(c1, c3)) = 3
3
√
τd(c1)τd(c2)τd(c3)− 1 if τd(c1)τd(c3) < τd(c2)2
µ(c3-win) = µ(piv(c1, c3)) = 2
√
τd(c1)τd(c3)− 1 + τd(c2) if τd(c1)τd(c3) > τd(c2)2
With a magnitude of zero, by the corollary, the probability of candidate c1 winning goes
to 1 as n gets large. Also, as the magnitude of a pivotal event between c1 and c2 is greater
than all other pivotal events, a pivotal event between c1 and c2 is infinitely more likely than
a pivotal event between any other pair as n gets large.
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Appendix B: Main Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
To prove the lemma, I show that the magnitude theorem and its corollary extend to a
multi-district setting.
Step 1: µ(x) =
∑
d
µ(xd).
Let x ≡ (x1, . . . , xd, . . . , xD) be the realised profile of votes across districts. The proba-
bility of a particular profile of votes is
Pr[x|nτ ] =
∏
d∈D
c∈{l,m,r}
(
e−nτd(c)(nτd(c))xd(c)
xd(c)!
)
(13)
After some manipulation, taking the log of both sides, and taking the limit as n → ∞
we get the magnitude of this profile of votes
µ(x) ≡ lim
n→∞
log(Pr[x|nτ ])
n
= lim
n→∞
∑
c∈{l,m,r}
∑
d∈D
τd(c)ψ
(
xd(c)
nτd(c)
)
(14)
Notice that the magnitude of a particular profile of votes across districts is simply the sum
of the magnitudes in each district. This is because each district’s realised profile of votes
is independent of all other districts. So while µ(xd) ∈ (−1, 0) in a single district, we have
µ(x) ∈ (−D, 0) when considering the profile of votes in all districts.
Step 2: If a particular profile of votes across districts, x, has a larger magnitude than
another, x′, the former is infinitely more likely to occur as n→∞.
The rate at which Pr[x|nτ ] goes to zero is enµ(x). Take another profile of votes across
districts x′ where µ(x′) < µ(x), then
lim
n→∞
Pr[x′|nτ ]
Pr[x|nτ ] = limn→∞
enµ(x
′)
enµ(x)
= lim
n→∞
en(µ(x
′)−µ(x)) = 0 (15)
As their probability ratio converges to zero, x is infinitely more likely than x′ to occur as
n→∞.
Step 3: Multi-District Magnitude Theorem. The magnitude theorem (Equation 9)
shows that the magnitude of an event occurring in a given district (such as a tie for
first) equals the magnitude of the most likely district vote profile in the set of district
vote profiles comprising that event. Here I extend this to the multi-district case. Let
A = (A1, . . . , Ad, . . . , AD) be a multi-district event, where each Ad is a particular district
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event. Let x¯d ∈ Ad = argmax
xd
∑
c∈{l,m,r}
τd(c)ψ
(
xd(c)
nτd(c)
)
, that is, x¯d is the most likely district
vote profile in Ad given τd . Then, we have
µ(A) =
D∑
d=1
µ(Ad) =
D∑
d=1
µ(x¯d) = µ(x¯) (16)
The first inequality follows from the independence of districts, the second equality follows
from the magnitude theorem and the independence of districts, the third equality follows
from Equation 14. Together they show that the single district magnitude theorem extends
to a multi-district setting.
Following from this, and using Equation 15, we have that the corollary to the magnitude
theorem also extends to the multi-district case. If µ(A′) < µ(A), then
lim
n→∞
Pr[A′|nτ ]
Pr[A|nτ ] = limn→∞
enµ(A
′)
enµ(A)
= lim
n→∞
en(µ(x¯
′)−µ(x¯)) = 0 (17)
Step 4: Voter’s Decision Problem
Let A(z, z′) = {A(z, z′),A′(z, z′),A′′(z, z′), . . .} be the set of multi-district events
such that a single vote in district d is pivotal and decisive between policies z and
z′. There are six different cases in which a vote may be pivotal and decisive
here: pivd(l,m)λ(z, z
′, z′′), pivd(l,m)λ(z′, z, z′′), pivd(l, r)λ(z, z′′, z′), pivd(l, r)λ(z′, z′′, z),
pivd(m, r)λ(z
′′, z, z′), pivd(m, r)λ(z′′, z′, z). Each case can occur from many different multi-
district events e.g A(z, z′) may have xd′(l) > xd′(m) > xd′(r) and xd′′(m) > xd′′(l) > xd′′(r)
while A′(z, z′) has the winners in d′ and d′′ reversed.42 Using Equation 17 and Equation 16
we get
µ(A(z, z′)) = µ(A¯(z, z′)) = µ(x¯(z, z′)) (18)
Where A¯(z, z′) is the event inA(z, z′) with largest magnitude, and x¯(z, z′) is the vote profile
in A¯(z, z′) with largest magnitude.
Let PivΛd ≡ {A(z, z′),A(z˜, z˜′), . . .} be the set of all distinct pivotal and decisive cases.
By Equation 18, comparing the elements in PivΛd requires simply comparing the vote profiles
with largest magnitude in each A. From Equation 15 we know that if one vote profile has a
larger magnitude than another it is infinitely more likely to occur as n goes to infinity. Thus,
if µ(A(z, z′)) > µ(A(z˜, z˜′)) for all A(z˜, z˜′) ∈ PivΛd then the former event is infinitely more
likely to occur. This being the case, a voter who is not indifferent between z and z′ need
only condition his vote choice on the unique most likely vote profile x¯(z, z′) ∈ A¯(z, z′) ∈
42From the perspective of a voter in district d the exact seats which are won in other districts don’t
matter, only their number.
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A(z, z′) ∈ PivΛd.
Proof of Proposition 1
I first prove that in any asymptotic strictly perfect equilibrium, each district is duverge-
rian. That is, the set of voters voting for a third candidate is of measure zero.
Step 1: A district is Duvergerian if there is a single pivotal and decisive event
with largest magnitude.
By Lemma 1, if there is a unique pivotal and decisive event with largest magnitude in
district d, then all voters will condition their vote choice on this event. Call this event
λidpivd(c1, c2). Each voter type compares his gain of voting for the three candidates.
lim
n→∞
Gt,d(vc1 |nτ )
Pr[λid]Pr[pivd(c1, c2)]
= ut(z
i
c1
)− ut(zic2)
lim
n→∞
Gt,d(vc2|nτ )
Pr[λid]Pr[pivd(c1, c2)]
= ut(z
i
c2
)− ut(zic1)
lim
n→∞
Gt,d(vc3|nτ )
Pr[λid]Pr[pivd(c1, c2)]
= 0
Those with ut(z
i
c1
) > ut(z
i
c2
) vote for c1, those with ut(z
i
c1
) < ut(z
i
c2
) vote for c2. Voters with
ut(z
i
c1
) = ut(z
i
c2
) are of measure zero. Therefore, in any district with a single pivotal and
decisive event with largest magnitude, only two candidates will receive positive vote shares.
Step 2: These Duvergerian equilibria are asymptotically strictly perfect. Con-
sider a small deviation from the profile of expected vote shares τ . Is σ∗ still a best response
for every player type in every district? Suppose not. Then there must exist a set of types
with positive measure who adopt a different strategy in this perturbed game. Note, however,
from Equation 12 that the magnitude of each event in a district is continuous in τd. It fol-
lows that the magnitude of a multi-district event µ[λidpivd(c1, c2)] is also continuous in τ . By
assumption µ[λidpivd(c1, c2)] is larger than the magnitude of any other pivotal and decisive
event. Therefore, by the continuity of µ[λidpivd(c1, c2)] in τ , we can find an  perturbation
of τ small enough such that µ[λidpivd(c1, c2)] always remains the largest magnitude of any
pivotal and decisive event. Each voter will thus vote as in Step 1 above, that is, the set of
players who adopt a different strategy when expected vote shares are perturbed is of measure
zero.
Step 3: If the pivotal and decisive event with largest magnitude in a district is
not unique, non-Duvergerian equilibria may exist. Note that in any non-Duvergerian
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Largest Magnitude Decisive Events in d Largest Magnitude Pivotal & Decisive Events in d Case Duv
τd(c1) > τd(c2) > τd(c3) > 0
λ1d, λ
2
d ∈ {Λ\λ(2|zc1 = zc2)} µ[λ1dpivd(c1, c2)] = µ[λ2dpivd(c1, c2)] i Yes
λ1d ∈ {λ(2|zc1 = zc2)}, λ2d ∈ {Λ\λ(2|zc1 = zc2)} µ[λ1dpivd(c1, c3)] = µ[λ2dpivd(c1, c2)] > µ[λ1dpivd(c2, c3)] iv No
µ[λ1dpivd(c1, c3)] = µ[λ
2
dpivd(c1, c2)] = µ[λ
1
dpivd(c2, c3)] iv No
µ[λ1dpivd(c1, c3)] = µ[λ
1
dpivd(c2, c3)] > µ[λ
2
dpivd(c1, c2)] ii Yes
λ1d, λ
2
d ∈ {λ(2|zc1 = zc2)} µ[λ1dpivd(c1, c3)] = µ[λ1dpivd(c2, c3)] = µ[λ2dpivd(c1, c3)] = µ[λ2dpivd(c2, c3)] iii Yes
τd(c1) = τd(c2) > τd(c3) > 0
λ1d, λ
2
d ∈ {Λ\λ(2|zc1 = zc2)} µ[λ1dpivd(c1, c2)] = µ[λ2dpivd(c1, c2)] i Yes
λ1d ∈ {λ(2|zc1 = zc2)}, λ2d ∈ {Λ\λ(2|zc1 = zc2)} µ[λ1dpivd(c1, c3)] = µ[λ2dpivd(c1, c2)] = µ[λ1dpivd(c2, c3)] iv No
µ[λ1dpivd(c1, c3)] = µ[λ
1
dpivd(c2, c3)] > µ[λ
2
dpivd(c1, c2)] ii No
λ1d, λ
2
d ∈ {λ(2|zc1 = zc2)} µ[λ1dpivd(c1, c3)] = µ[λ1dpivd(c2, c3)] = µ[λ2dpivd(c1, c3)] = µ[λ2dpivd(c2, c3)] iii No
τd(c1) > τd(c2) = τd(c3) > 0
λ1d, λ
2
d ∈ {Λ\λ(2|zc1 = zc2)} µ[λ1dpivd(c1, c2)] = µ[λ1dpivd(c1, c3)] > µ[λ2dpivd(c1, c2)] iv No
µ[λ1dpivd(c1, c2)] = µ[λ
1
dpivd(c1, c3)] = µ[λ
2
dpivd(c1, c2)] = µ[λ
2
dpivd(c1, c3)] v No
λ1d ∈ {λ(2|zc1 = zc2)}, λ2d ∈ {Λ\λ(2|zc1 = zc2)} µ[λ1dpivd(c1, c3)] = µ[λ2dpivd(c1, c2)] = µ[λ2dpivd(c1, c3)] iv No
τd(c1) = τd(c2) = τd(c3) > 0
λ1d, λ
2
d ∈ {Λ\λ(2|zc1 = zc2)} µ[λ1dpivd(c1, c3)] = µ[λ1dpivd(c2, c3)] > µ[λ2dpivd(c1, c2)] ii No
µ[λ1dpivd(c, c
′)] = µ[λ2dpivd(c, c
′)] ∀c, c′ v No
λ1d ∈ {λ(2|zc1 = zc2)}, λ2d ∈ {Λ\λ(2|zc1 = zc2)} µ[λ1dpivd(c1, c3)] = µ[λ1dpivd(c2, c3)] > µ[λ2dpivd(c1, c2)] ii No
µ[λ1dpivd(c, c
′)] = µ[λ2dpivd(c, c
′)] ∀c, c′ v No
λ1d, λ
2
d ∈ {λ(2|zc1 = zc2)} µ[λ1dpivd(c1, c3)] = µ[λ1dpivd(c2, c3)] = µ[λ2dpivd(c1, c3)] = µ[λ2dpivd(c2, c3)] iii No
Table 2: Cases where τ1, τ2, τ3 > 0 and pivotal & decisive event with largest magnitude is
not unique
equilibrium we must have σt,d(c1),σt′,d(c2), σt′′,d(c3) > 0 for some t, t
′, t′′ ∈ [−1, 1]. By
Equation 1 this means τd(c1), τd(c2), τd(c3) > 0 must also hold. Therefore I examine the
various cases where both (i) τd(c1), τd(c2), τd(c3) > 0 and (ii) the largest magnitude pivotal
and decisive event is not unique. These different events are listed in Table 2. The first column
shows the type of decisive events which have largest magnitude. The set λ(2|zc1 = zc2)
consists of those λ(2) decisive events where electing either of the front-runners would bring
about the same policy. The third column splits the various events into five cases. The final
shows - as I now prove - that case i is duvergerian, cases ii, iii may not be duvergerian, while
iv and v are non-duvergerian.
Step3a: Case i is Duvergerian
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i In each case µ[λ1dpivd(c1, c2)] = µ[λ
2
dpivd(c1, c2)] .
By the offset theorem (Equation 11) we have lim
n→∞
Pr[λ2dpivd(c1,c2)]
Pr[λ1dpivd(c1,c2)]
≡ φ ∈ (0, 1]. Note φ > 1
is not possible because, by assumption µ(λ1d) ≥ µ(λ2d). Therefore we have:
lim
n→∞
Gt,d(vc1|nτ )
Pr[λ1d]Pr[pivd(c1, c2)]
= ut(z
1
c1
)− ut(z1c2) + φ[ut(z2c1)− ut(z2c2)]
lim
n→∞
Gt,d(vc2|nτ )
Pr[λ1d]Pr[pivd(c1, c2)]
= ut(z
1
c2
)− ut(z1c1) + φ[ut(z2c2)− ut(z2c1)]
lim
n→∞
Gt,d(vc3|nτ )
Pr[λ1d]Pr[pivd(c1, c2)]
= 0
(19)
Those with ut(z
1
c1
)+φut(z
2
c1
) > ut(z
1
c2
)+φut(z
2
c2
) vote for c1, those with ut(z
1
c1
)+φut(z
2
c1
) <
ut(z
1
c2
) + φut(z
2
c2
) vote for c2. Indifferent voters are of measure zero.
Step3b: Cases ii, iii, iv and v have non-Duvergerian equilbria
ii In each case µ[λ1dpivd(c1, c3)] = µ[λ
1
dpivd(c2, c3)] > µ[λ
2
dpivd(c1, c2)] .
Here the event λ1dpivd(c1, c2) is not relevant because z
1
c1
= z1c2 . The magnitudes of
pivd(c1, c3) and pivd(c2, c3) are the same because the most likely event in which they
occur is when all three candidates get exactly the same number of votes. However, the
events consist of more than just this event. In an event pivd(c1, c3) , candidate c2 must
have the same or fewer votes than the others. Similarly, in an event pivd(c2, c3) , can-
didate c1 must have the same or fewer votes than the others. We can once again use
the offset theorem, now letting φ ≡ lim
n→∞
Pr[λ1dpivd(c2,c3)]
Pr[λ1dpivd(c1,c3)]
. If τd(c1) > τd(c2) then, by the
decomposition property, for any given number of votes c3 has, c1 is always more likely
to have more votes than c2. Therefore, it must be that φ < 1. If instead τd(c1) = τd(c2)
then both c1 and c2 are equally likely to tie for first with c3, giving φ = 1. The gain
functions below show the decision facing each voter type.
lim
n→∞
Gt,d(vc1|nτ )
Pr[λ1d]Pr[pivd(c1, c3)]
= ut(z
1
c1
)− ut(z1c3)
lim
n→∞
Gt,d(vc2|nτ )
Pr[λ1d]Pr[pivd(c1, c3)]
= φ[ut(z
1
c1
)− ut(z1c3)]
lim
n→∞
Gt,d(vc3|nτ )
Pr[λ1d]Pr[pivd(c1, c3)]
= ut(z
1
c3
)− ut(z1c1) + φ[ut(z1c3)− ut(z1c1)]
(20)
If φ < 1 then any voter with ut(z
1
c1
) > ut(z
1
c3
) votes for c1 while any voter with ut(z
1
c3
) <
ut(z
1
c1
) votes for c3. Voting for c2 is dominated by voting for c1. With φ < 1 there is no
multi-candidate support. If φ = 1 any voter with ut(z
1
c1
) > ut(z
1
c3
) is indifferent between
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voting for c1 and c2 while any voter with ut(z
1
c3
) < ut(z
1
c1
) votes for c3. Thus, we have a
non-duvergerian equilibrium when τd(c1) = τd(c2) ≥ τd(c3).
iii In each case µ[λ1dpivd(c1, c3)] = µ[λ
1
dpivd(c2, c3)] = µ[λ
2
dpivd(c1, c3)] = µ[λ
2
dpivd(c2, c3)].
Letting lim
n→∞
Pr[λ2d]
Pr[λ1d]
≡ φλ ∈ (0, 1] and lim
n→∞
Pr[pivd(c2,c3)]
Pr[pivd(c1,c3)]
≡ φpiv ∈ (0, 1] we have:
lim
n→∞
Gt,d(vc1|nτ )
Pr[λ1d]Pr[pivd(c1, c3)]
= ut(z
1
c1
)− ut(z1c3) + φλ[ut(z2c1)− ut(z2c3)]
lim
n→∞
Gt,d(vc2 |nτ )
Pr[λ1d]Pr[pivd(c1, c3)]
= φpiv[ut(z
1
c1
)− ut(z1c3) + φλ[ut(z2c1)− ut(z2c3)]]
lim
n→∞
Gt,d(vc3|nτ )
Pr[λ1d]Pr[pivd(c1, c3)]
= (1 + φpiv)[ut(z
1
c3
)− ut(z1c1) + φλ[ut(z2c3)− ut(z2c1)]]
(21)
If φpiv < 1 any voter with ut(z
1
c1
) + φλut(z
2
c1
) > ut(z
1
c3
) + φλut(z
2
c3
) votes for c1 while any
voter with ut(z
1
c1
) + φλut(z
2
c1
) < ut(z
1
c3
) + φλut(z
2
c3
) votes for c3. Thus, with φ
piv < 1
there is no multi-candidate support. If φpiv = 1 any voter with ut(z
1
c1
) + φλut(z
2
c1
) >
ut(z
1
c3
)+φλut(z
2
c3
) is indifferent between voting for c1 and c2 while any voter with ut(z
1
c1
)+
φλut(z
2
c1
) < ut(z
1
c3
)+φλut(z
2
c3
) votes for c3. Thus, we have a non-duvergerian equilibrium
when τd(c1) = τd(c2) ≥ τd(c3).
iv In each case either µ[λ1dpivd(c1, c3)] = µ[λ
2
dpivd(c1, c2)] or µ[λ
1
dpivd(c1, c3)] =
µ[λ1dpivd(c1, c2)].
I show the case where µ[λ1dpivd(c1, c3)] = µ[λ
2
dpivd(c1, c2)] is the largest magnitude
event (the other case is almost identical). Note that in this case we must have
λ1d ∈ {λ(2|zc1 = zc2)}, therefore z1c1 = z1c2 .
Letting lim
n→∞
Pr[λ2d]
Pr[λ1d]
≡ φλ and lim
n→∞
Pr[pivd(c1,c3)]
Pr[pivd(c1,c32)]
≡ φpiv we have:
lim
n→∞
Gt,d(vc1|nτ )
Pr[λ2d]Pr[pivd(c1, c2)]
= φλ[ut(z
2
c1
)− ut(z2c2)] + φpiv[ut(z1c1)− ut(z1c3)]
lim
n→∞
Gt,d(vc2|nτ )
Pr[λ2d]Pr[pivd(c1, c2)]
= φλ[ut(z
2
c2
)− ut(z2c1)]
lim
n→∞
Gt,d(vc3|nτ )
Pr[λ2d]Pr[pivd(c1, c2)]
= φpiv[ut(z
1
c3
)− ut(z1c1)]
(22)
Manipulating these expressions, one can show that there exist values of z1c1 , z
1
c3
, z2c1 , z
2
c2
such that no action is dominated for all voter types. Thus, non-Duvergerian equilibria
can exist.
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v In each case we have (at least) µ[λ1dpivd(c1, c2)] = µ[λ
2
dpivd(c1, c2)] = µ[λ
1
dpivd(c1, c3)] =
µ[λ2dpivd(c1, c3)].
Here we always have Pr[pivd(c1, c2)] = Pr[pivd(c1, c3)]. Below I show the gain func-
tions for µ[λ1dpivd(c, c
′)] = µ[λ2dpivd(c, c
′)] for all c, c′. Letting lim
n→∞
Pr[λ2d]
Pr[λ1d]
≡ φλ and
lim
n→∞
Pr[pivd(c1,c3)]
Pr[pivd(c1,c2)]
≡ φpiv(1,3) and lim
n→∞
Pr[pivd(c2,c3)]
Pr[pivd(c1,c3)]
≡ φpiv(2,3) we have:
lim
n→∞
Gt,d(vc1|nτ )
Pr[λ1d]Pr[pivd(c1, c2)]
= ut(z
1
c1
)− ut(z1c2) + φpiv(1,3)[ut(z1c1)− ut(z1c3)]
+ φλ[ut(z
2
c1
)− ut(z2c2) + φpiv(1,3)[ut(z2c1)− ut(z2c3)]]
lim
n→∞
Gt,d(vc2|nτ )
Pr[λ1d]Pr[pivd(c1, c2)]
= ut(z
1
c2
)− ut(z1c1) + φpiv(2,3)[ut(z1c2)− ut(z1c3)]
+ φλ[ut(z
2
c2
)− ut(z2c1)] + φpiv(2,3)[ut(z2c2)− ut(z2c3)]]
lim
n→∞
Gt,d(vc3|nτ )
Pr[λ1d]Pr[pivd(c1, c2)]
= φpiv(1,3)[ut(z
1
c3
)− ut(z1c1)] + φpiv(2,3)[ut(z1c3)− ut(z1c2)]
+ φλ[φpiv(1,3)[ut(z
2
c3
)− ut(z2c1)] + φpiv(2,3)[ut(z2c3)− ut(z2c2)]]
(23)
Manipulating these expressions, one can show that there exist values of
z1c1 , z
1
c2
, z1c3 , z
2
c1
, z2c2 , z
2
c3
such that no action is dominated for all voter types. Thus, non-
Duvergerian equilibria can exist.
Step 4: These non-Duvergerian equilibria are not asymptotically strictly per-
fect.
As n → ∞, if there is a unique most likely event in which his vote is both pivotal and
decisive over two distinct policy outcomes, then a voter need only condition his choice on
this single event. I now show that for some perturbation of τ in each of the duvergerian
cases above, the best response of some player types changes, returning us to duvergerian
equilibria. Thus non-duvergerian equilibria are not asymptotically strictly perfect.
• Case ii: Non-Duvergerian equilibria arise here only when τd(c1) = τd(c2) ≥ τd(c3). A
perturbation of τ which yields τd(c1) > τd(c2) will give φ < 1 in Equation 20.
• Case iii: As above, non-Duvergerian equilibria arise here only when τd(c1) = τd(c2) ≥
τd(c3). A perturbation of τ which yields τd(c1) > τd(c2) will give φ
piv < 1 in Equa-
tion 21.
• Case iv: In each case here either λ1dpivd(c1, c2) or λ2dpivd(c1, c2) is one of the events
with joint largest magnitude. A perturbation of τ which reduces τd(c3) will give
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µ[pivd(c1, c2)] > µ[pivd(c1, c3)],µ[pivd(c2, c3)] and therefore φ
piv = 0 in Equation 22
This means voting for c3 is dominated for all players, returning us to a duvergerian
equilibrium.
• Case v: Each case here has both λ1dpivd(c1, c2) and λ2dpivd(c1, c2) as two of the many
events with joint largest magnitude. A perturbation of τ which reduces τd(c3) will
give µ[pivd(c1, c2)] > µ[pivd(c1, c3)],µ[pivd(c2, c3)] and therefore φ
piv(1,3) = φpiv(2,3) = 0
in Equation 23. Those with ut(z
1
c1
) + φλut(z
2
c1
) > ut(z
1
c2
) + φλut(z
2
c2
) vote for c1, those
with ut(z
1
c1
) +φλut(z
2
c1
) < ut(z
1
c2
) +φλut(z
2
c2
) vote for c2, while no player type votes for
the dominated choice c3. Indifferent voters are of measure zero.
Step 2: Multiple Equilibria always exist.
A simple example proves the existence of multiple pure strategy equilibria for any bar-
gaining rule where a majority is needed to implement a policy z. For any f , suppose the
right party is never serious in any district. All races will be between l and m. We will
have E(S−dl) = (k − 1, D − k, 0) and E(S−dm) = (k,D − k − 1, 0) for some k ∈ (0, D). As
party r receives no votes, every district must be conditioning on the same decisive event
(D−1
2
, D−1
2
, 0). When conditioning on this λ, voters will face a choice between al, am, and
a third policy which would come about if r wins a seat. All the districts focusing on races
between l and m is an equilibrium as no individual would deviate and vote for r. Simi-
larly, it is possible that all districts ignore the left party, and so an equilibrium will have
every district conditioning on (0, D−1
2
, D−1
2
), or that all districts ignore the moderate party
and all condition on (D−1
2
, 0, D−1
2
). These three equilibria always exist for any majoritarian
bargaining rule.
Proof of Corollary to Proposition 1
By Proposition 1, an equilibrium always exists in which l and m are the serious candidates
in every district. Party m will be the expected winner in none of these districts only if the
median voter in every district prefers al to am. Suppose this is the case. By Proposition
1, another equilibrium always exists in which m and r are the serious candidates in every
district. Here voters face a choice between am and ar. As the median voter in each district
prefers al to am, they must each also prefer am to ar. Thus, if this equilibrium is played,
party m will win every seat. Thus by focusing on either one of these two equilibria we can
ensure, for any distribution of voter preferences, that party m always wins at least 1 seat.
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Lemma 2
A sufficient condition for µ(λid(z
i)) > µ(λjd(z
j)) is that the set of pivotal events with
largest magnitude required for λid(z
i) to occur, Kd(z
i), is a subset of those required for
λjd(z
j) to occur, Kd(z
j).
Proof of Lemma 2
From Equation 18 we have µ(λid(z
i)) =
D−1∑
d′=1
µ(x¯d′) ∈ (−D + 1, 0). That is the magnitude
of a particular decisive event, from the point of view of district d is simply the sum of
the magnitudes of the most likely vote profiles in each district d′ 6= d which bring about
that decisive event. We can use µ(c1 − win) = 0 and µ(c2 − win) = µ(pivd′(c1, c2)) from
Equation 12 and re-write
µ(λid(z
i)) =
k∑
d′=1
µ(pivd′(c1, c2)) ∈ (−k, 0)
Where there are k districts in which the expected winner loses. Let Kd(z
i) be the set of
these k pivotal events. Let another decisive event for district d be zj with magnitude
µ(λjd(z
j)) =
k′∑
d′=1
µ(pivd′(c1, c2)) ∈ (−k′, 0)
Where there are k′ districts in which the expected winner loses. Let Kd(zj) be the set of
these k′ pivotal events. Furthermore let Kd(zi) ⊂ Kd(zj). As magnitudes are negative
numbers, it must be that
k∑
d′=1
µ(pivd′(c1, c2)) >
k∑
d′=1
µ(pivd′(c1, c2)) +
k′∑
d′=k+1
µ(pivd′(c1, c2))
or
µ(λid(z
i)) > µ(λjd(z
j)) (24)
Thus if Kd(z
i) ⊂Kd(zj) then µ(λid(zi)) > µ(λjd(zj)).
Corollary to Lemma 2
For a given E(S−d) and Λ, we have λd(z) = λ1d if ∀λ(z′) 6= λ(z) ∈ Λ we have Kd(z) ⊂
Kd(z
′).
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Proof of Proposition 2
From Proposition 0, for E(z) = al we must have an expected majority for the left party,
E(sl) >
D−1
2
. By Proposition 1, each dl district must have either l and m or l and r as the
serious candidates. Therefore, also by Proposition 1, if a dl district has λ
1
dl
= λ(al, am, am),
it must be conditioning on this decisive event. If a district d is conditioning on λ(al, am, am),
the expected winner will be party l if the expected median voter prefers al to am, that is if
t˜d < alm. As party l is the expected winner in dl districts, any dl district conditioning on
λ(al, am, am) must have t˜d < alm. If each dl has λ
1
dl
= λ(al, am, am) and E(sl) >
D−1
2
then
t˜D+1
2
< alm.
All that remains is to show that when E(z) = al and E(sm) > 0 each dl has λ
1
dl
=
λ(al, am, am). I show that case of E(sm) = 1 as the case of E(sm) > 1 is analogous.
Let Kdl(λ(am, am, ar)) be the sequence of pivotal events with largest magnitude result-
ing in λdl = λ(am, am, ar). Let Kdl(λ(al, am, ar)) be the sequence of pivotal events with
largest magnitude resulting in λdl = λ(al, am, ar). Then given E(S−dl) = (
D−1
2
+ k, 1, D−3
2
−
k) it must be that Kdl(λ(al, am, am)) ⊂ Kdl(λ(am, am, ar)) and Kdl(λ(al, am, am)) ⊂
Kdl(λ(al, am, ar)). That is, the pivotal events needed to move from E(S−dl) to λ(al, am, am)
are a subset of those needed to move from E(S−dl) to λ(am, am, ar) or λ(al, am, ar). By the
Corollary to Lemma 2 this means λ1d = λ(al, am, am).
It is analogous to show that a necessary condition for E(z) = ar is t˜D+1
2
> amr.
Proof of Proposition 3
Case 1: t˜D+1
2
, t˜med ∈ (alm, amr).
In a legislative election with E(sm) > 0 (for possibly exogenous reasons) the only two
decisive events are λ(al, am, am) and λ(am, am, ar). Given, t˜D+1
2
∈ (alm, amr), in each case
the winning policy will be am. Instead, in a single district election, there are three possible
equilibria in which the serious candidates are (l,m), (m, r), and (l, r) respectively. Given,
t˜med ∈ (alm, amr), policy am will be implemented in the first two cases. When the race is
between l and r, the winning policy will be either al or ar - both of which t˜med prefers less
than am. Thus, t˜med strictly prefers a legislative election to a single district election if there
is a chance that (l, r) is focal, and weakly prefers a legislative election otherwise.
Case 2: t˜med < alm < t˜D+1
2
or if t˜D+1
2
< amr < t˜med.
I show the case of t˜D+1
2
< amr < t˜med as the other is symmetric.
First, suppose t˜D+1
2
∈ (alm, amr). As above, in a legislative election with E(sm) > 0 the
only two decisive events are λ(al, am, am) and λ(am, am, ar). In each case the winning policy
will be am. In a single district election, the winning policies in the races (l,m), (m, r), and
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(l, r) are am, ar and ar respectively. As t˜med has ar  am  al he will be weakly better off
under a single district election, and will be strictly so if there is a chance that the focal race
is not (l,m). Next suppose t˜D+1
2
< alm. In the decisive legislative events λ(al, am, am) and
λ(am, am, ar) the winning policies are al and am respectively. As before, in a single district
election, the winning policies in the races (l,m), (m, r), and (l, r) are am, ar and ar. As t˜med
will be weakly better off under a single district election if λ(am, am, ar) is focal in a legislative
election while (l,m) is focal in a single district election. In any other case, he will be strictly
better off under a single district election.
Case 3: In all other cases the welfare effect is ambiguous.
In the remainder of cases we either have t˜D+1
2
< alm and t˜med < amr; or else t˜D+1
2
> amr and
t˜med > alm. I prove the former case as the latter is symmetric.
First, suppose t˜med ∈ (alm, amr). In the decisive legislative events λ(al, am, am) and
λ(am, am, ar) the winning policies are al and am respectively. In a single district election,
the winning policy is am in the races (l,m) and (m, r), while the winning policy in (l, r) is
either al or ar depending on whether t˜med < alr or not. Under both legislative and single
district elections, the preferred policy of t˜med (am) may or may not be the policy outcome,
depending on which equilibrium is played. Therefore, we can make no statement about when
one system or the other is preferred.
Next suppose t˜med < alm. As t˜D+1
2
is unchanged, the winning policies in the decisive
legislative events λ(al, am, am) and λ(am, am, ar) are again al and am. In a single district
election, the winning policies in the races (l,m), (m, r), and (l, r) are now al, am and al.
Under both legislative and single district elections, the preferred policy of t˜med (al) may or
may not be the policy outcome, depending on which equilibrium is played. Therefore, we
can make no statement about when one system or the other is preferred.
Proof of Proposition 4
By Proposition 1, only two candidates will receive votes in each district. With D districts
there will be 2D serious candidates. If party r’s candidates are serious in fewer than D−1
2
districts, the decisive event in which an extra seat for party r gives them a majority can
never come about. Therefore, in any equilibrium where party r is serious in fewer than D−1
2
districts, the only decisive event voters can condition on is λ(al, am, am). As this is the only
decisive event, in each district, voters with t < alm will vote vl while those with t > alm will
vote for whichever of m or r is a serious candidate. An analogous result holds when party l
is serious in fewer than D−1
2
districts.
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Proof of Proposition 5
From Table 1 we see that when 3∆l > ∆r, z = al is only possible if sl >
D−1
2
. As such
E(z) = al requires E(sl) >
D−1
2
. By Lemma 2, if E(sl) >
D−1
2
then λ1dl must be in the set of
decisive events Λsl=D−12
⊂ Λ. In addition if E(sm) > 1 then λ1dl must be in the set of decisive
events Λsm>1,sl=D−12
⊂ Λsl=D−12 .
From Table 1 we see that when 3∆l > ∆r, any decisive event λ
i in the set Λsm>1,sl=D−12
has zil = al 6= zim, zir. From Proposition 1, each dl must have either l and r or else l and m
as serious candidates. Therefore, with E(sl) >
D−1
2
, all dl districts must be conditioning on
decisive events in Λsm>1,sl=D−12
.
By the definition of a dl district, the median voter in dl must prefer z
i
l = al to the some
alternative: either zim or z
i
r. The set of policies in Λsm>1,sl=D−12
are {al, alm, alr, 2am−alr, am}.
Suppose a district dl conditions on a race where z
i
l = al and the serious alternative is am. It
is immediate to see that t˜dl < alm. It is also immediate to see that if the serious alternative
was some other policy z′ then t˜dl <
al+z
′
2
. As am is the rightmost policy in the set, a necessary
condition for a dl district when E(sl) >
D−1
2
is t˜ < alm. Thus, it must be that t˜D+1
2
< alm in
order for z = al to come about.
Following the same steps as above, it is analogous to show that when 3∆r > ∆l and
E(sm) > 1, then E(z) = ar requires t˜D+1
2
> amr.
Proof of Proposition 6
Case 1: ∆l = ∆r. Suppose party r is a serious candidate in fewer than
D−1
4
districts;
then it can win at most that many seats. The possible election outcomes are either a party l
majority giving z = al, a party m majority giving z = am, or no majority but where party r
has the least seats. From Table 1 we see that when ∆l = ∆r, the policy outcome will be am
if no party has a majority and r is the smallest party. Conditional on r winning fewer than
D−1
4
districts, the only decisive event is therefore λ(al, am, am), when l wins
D−1
2
seats and
m is the second largest party. Given that only this distinct decisive event exists, all voters
must be conditioning on it. As electing m or r here brings about the same policy, voters are
indifferent between the two. In each district, those with t < alm will vote vl while those with
t > alm will coordinate on either vm or vr. With a choice over 2 policies in each district, no
voter will be casting a misaligned vote. The case of l being a serious candidate in fewer than
D−1
4
districts is analogous.
Case 2: ∆l < ∆r. The only difference from Case 1 we need to consider is when sr <
D−1
4
and no party has a majority. From Table 1 we see that when ∆l < ∆r, then with
D+1
2
>
sl, sm > sr the policy outcome will be am. As shown above, when r is serious in fewer than
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D−1
4
districts, the only distinct decisive case is λ(al, am, am). All districts will condition on
this event and, as before, there is no misaligned voting.
Case 3: ∆l < ∆r. The possible election outcomes are either a party r majority giving
z = ar, a party m majority giving z = am, or no majority but where party l has the least
seats. From Table 1 we see that when ∆r < ∆l, if
D+1
2
> sr, sm > sl the policy outcome will
be am. Therefore, when l is serious in fewer than
D−1
4
districts, the only distinct decisive
event is λ(am, am, ar). All districts will condition on this event and there is no misaligned
voting.
Proof of Proposition 7
Case 1: Recall from Proposition 1 that if λ1d = λ(2
′) then voters in d must be conditioning
on it. Furthermore, by Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 voters condition on the unique most likely
pivotal and decisive event in which they are not indifferent. Whichever option a voter prefers
in this case will also be his preferred over all possible decisive events. By the definition of a
λ(2′) event, one of the 3 policy outcomes, z1c′′ , is dominated for each voter by one of the two
other policies, z1c and z
1
c′ . Therefore as long as z
1
c′′ is not serious, there will be no misaligned
voting - no voter would wish to change their vote if it could unilaterally decide the district.
Case 2: Let the most likely decisive event λ1d be a λ(2) event where candidates c and
c′ are serious. If voters are conditioning on λ1d it must be that z
1
c = z
1
c′′ or z
1
c′ = z
1
c′′ ; Here,
I take it to be the former. Without loss of generality let z1c < z
1
c′ . Any voter type with
t >
z1c+z
1
c′
2
will vote vc′ , while any other type will vote vc. The former group cannot be
casting misaligned votes as they have ut(z
1
c′) > ut(z
1
c ), and the decisive event λ
1
d is infinitely
more likely than all others. Next, we need to consider whether any of the voters choosing
vc might be misaligned. All of these voters have ut(z
1
c ) = ut(z
1
c′′) > ut(z
1
c′), so that they
want to beat c′ but are indifferent between c and c′′ in this most likely decisive event. If
one of these voters could unilaterally decide which candidate coordination takes place on,
he would decide by looking at the most likely pivotal event in which zc 6= zc′′ , call this
event λi. If ut(z
i
c) > ut(z
i
c′′) then voter type t would prefer coordination to take place on
candidate c, while if ut(z
i
c) < ut(z
i
c′′) she’d want coordination on c
′′. Therefore, there is
no misaligned voting in the district if there exists no type such that ut(z
i
c) < ut(z
i
c′′) and
ut(z
1
c ) = ut(z
1
c′′) > ut(z
1
c′) when c and c
′ are the serious candidates.
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Appendix C: Impatient Parties
In this section, I examine how the results of the benchmark model change when δ < 1, so
that parties are no longer perfectly patient. It is likely that the discount rates of politicians
vary across countries depending on things such as constitutional constraints of bargaining,
the status quo, and the propensity of politicians to be reelected.43
In the benchmark model it didn’t matter whether the bargaining protocol was random
or had a fixed order; a coalition would always implement z = am. Once parties discount
the future, we get different policy outcomes depending on which of the two is used. Also,
once discounting is introduced into a bargaining model, one needs to decide whether players
receive payoffs at each stage of bargaining or only once an agreement is reached. In the former
case, the location of a status quo policy, Q, will be important for final policy outcomes. The
literature is far from united in the treatment of stage utilities in government formation.
With no stage payoffs, Jackson and Moselle (2002) show that there exists δ∗ < 1 such that
if δ ≥ δ∗ then the coalition policy will be within  of am. However, their model doesn’t lend
itself easily to the current setup as mixing over proposals means precise policy outcomes
are not pinned down. Therefore, I follow Austen-Smith and Banks (2005) and Banks and
Duggan (2006) in having players receive stage payoffs. I assume the status quo is neither
too extreme, Q ∈ (−∆c,∆c) where ∆c = min{∆l,∆r}, nor too central Q 6= am.44
In each period where no agreement is reached, the status quo policy remains and enters
party’s payoff functions. All parties discount the future at the same rate of δ ∈ (0, 1).
Therefore, if a proposal y is passed in period t, the payoff of party c is
Wc = −(1− δt−1)(Q− ac)2 − δt−1(y − ac)2 (25)
For ease of analysis I assume, without loss of generality, that am = 0.
45 Banks and Duggan
(2000) show that all stationary equilibria are no-delay equilibria and are in pure strategies
when the policy space is one-dimensional and δ < 1.
Fixed Order Bargaining
The order of recognition is fixed and follows the ranking of parties’ seat shares. In
Appendix D, I derive the policy outcomes for any ordering of parties; these are presented in
43After the 2010 Belgian elections, legislative bargaining lasted for a record-breaking 541 days, suggesting
high values of δ. Conversely, after the 2010 U.K. elections, a coalition government was formed within five
days.
44If Q = am the result is the same as the benchmark case of δ = 1.
45Taking any original positions (al, am 6= 0, ar), we can always alter f so that the preferences of all voter
types are the same when (a′l, a
′
m = 0, a
′
r).
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Table 3 below along with policies for specific values of δ and Q. From the table we see that
the further party m moves down the ranking of seat shares, the further the coalition policy
moves away from am.
Seat Share Policy δ = 0.95 δ = 0.95 δ = 0.9
|Q| = 0.5 |Q| = 0.25 |Q| = 0.5
sl > (D − 1)/2 al < −0.5 < −0.25 < −0.5
(D + 1)/2 > sl > sr > sm −
√
(1− δ2)Q2 −0.156 −0.078 −0.218
(D + 1)/2 > sl > sm > sr −
√
(1− δ)Q2 −0.112 −0.056 −0.158
sm > sl, sr am = 0 0 0 0
(D + 1)/2 > sr > sm > sl
√
(1− δ)Q2 0.112 0.056 0.158
(D + 1)/2 > sr > sl > sm
√
(1− δ2)Q2 0.156 0.078 0.218
sr > (D − 1)/2 ar > 0.5 > 0.25 > 0.5
Table 3: Policy outcomes with fixed order bargaining over policy and δ < 1.
The proposition below shows that when the bargaining protocol is fixed, parties discount
the future, and the status quo is not exactly am, it is even more difficult to have extreme
outcomes than is the case in the benchmark model.
Proposition 8. In any equilibrium with a fixed order of bargaining over policy and δ < 1 in
which the moderate party is expected to win at least one seat:
1. If E(sr) > 1, then the expected policy can be al only if t˜D+1
2
<
al−
√
(1−δ)Q2
2
< alm.
2. If E(sl) > 1, then the expected policy can be ar only if t˜D+1
2
>
ar+
√
(1−δ)Q2
2
> amr.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Here, a majority government will only come about if the electorate is even more biased
in favour of policy extreme policies than in the benchmark case.46 The reason is that in
the benchmark case every coalition implements z = am, while with discounting and a fixed
order protocol, the largest party has an advantage in coalition negotiations and can use this
to get an alternative policy passed. Voters anticipate this power in coalition formation, so
will only vote to bring about an l majority if they prefer it to an l-led coalition.
For example, if al = −1, δ = 0.95 and |Q| = 0.25 then an l coalition would implement a
policy −0.078 or −0.056. Realising the advantage of party l in bargaining, voters will only
approve al if t˜D+1
2
< −0.528, which is slightly to the left of the indifferent type alm in the
benchmark case. What the proposition also shows is that the further the status quo is from
46It is worth mentioning that without the restriction to E(sr) > 1 and E(sl) > 1 in the proposition, the
thresholds become t˜D+1
2
< alm and t˜D+1
2
> amr as in the benchmark case.
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am, the more likely we are to have coalition governments, all else equal. This is because a
more distant status quo gives the formateur even more bargaining power over the moderate
party. For example, if al = −1, δ = 0.95 and |Q| = 0.5 then an l majority implementing al
can only come about if t˜D+1
2
< −0.556. Similarly, reducing the discount factor will strengthen
the bargaining hand of the formateur: setting δ = 0.9 means z = al requires t˜D+1
2
< −0.579.
Under this bargaining protocol, we cannot rule out misaligned voting completely. The
decisive events where one party has no seats are all λ(3) events, so for any E(S) at least one
of these λ(3) events can always be conditioned on. As shown earlier, if a district conditions
on a λ(3) event there must be misaligned voting in that district. Nonetheless, Proposition 7
still holds here: there are equilibria with no misaligned voting in a subset of districts - an
improvement on a single plurality election. The following proposition summarises the state
of misaligned voting under this bargaining rule.
Proposition 9. In any equilibrium with a fixed order of bargaining over policy and δ < 1,
there is always misaligned voting in at least one district. However, equilibria exist in which
there is no misaligned voting in a subset of districts.
Random Recognition Bargaining
In each period one party is randomly selected as formateur, where the probability of
each party being chosen is equal to its seat share in the legislature, sc
D
. Party payoffs are
again given by Equation 25. As usual if a party has a majority of seats it will implement
its preferred policy. Following Banks and Duggan (2006), when no party has a majority I
look for an equilibrium of the form yl = am − Ω, ym = am, yr = am + Ω. Cho and Duggan
(2003) show that this stationary equilibrium is unique. As bargaining is only over policy,
any minimum winning coalition will include party m. When there was no discounting this
meant party m could always achieve z = am. Now, however, the presence of discounting
and Q 6= 0 allows parties l and r to offer policies further away from am, which party m will
nonetheless support. The moderate party will be indifferent between accepting and rejecting
an offer y when
Wm(y) = −(Ω)2 = −(1− δ)(Q)2 − δ(D − sm)
D
(Ω)2 (26)
which, when rearranged gives
Ω =
√
(1− δ)Q2
1− δD−sm
D
(27)
Table 4 shows the equilibrium offer each party will make when chosen as formateur. Notice
that the policies offered by l and r depend on the seat share of party m. The more seats
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party m has, the closer these offers get to zero. The other thing to notice is that the policies
lie inside (−Q,Q).
Formateur Policy
yl −
√
1−δ
1−δD−sm
D
Q2 > −|Q|
ym am = 0
yr
√
1−δ
1−δD−sm
D
Q2 < |Q|
Table 4: Policy proposals with random order bargaining over policy, δ < 1.
For a seat distribution such that no party has a majority, the expected policy outcome
from bargaining is
E(z) = − sl
D
(√
1− δ
1− δD−sm
D
Q2
)
+
sm
D
(0) +
sr
D
(√
1− δ
1− δD−sm
D
Q2
)
(28)
An extra seat for any of the three parties will increase their respective probabilities of
being the formateur and so affect the expected policy outcome. Thus, every district always
conditions on a choice between three distinct (expected) policies. We also see that as sm
increases, the expected policy moves closer and closer to zero. This occurs for two reasons;
firstly because there is a higher probability of party m being the formateur, and secondly
because sm enters the policy offers of l and r; as sm increases the absolute value of these
policies shrink.
The proposition below shows that when the bargaining protocol is random, parties dis-
count the future, and the status quo is not exactly am, it is easier for a non-centrist party to
win a majority of seats and implement its preferred policy than is the case in the benchmark
model (though still more difficult than in a single district election).
Proposition 10. In any equilibrium with a random order of bargaining over policy and δ < 1
in which the moderate party is expected to win at least one seat:
1. The expected policy can be al only if t˜D+1
2
< z∗l , where alm < z
∗
l < am, alr.
2. The expected policy can be ar only if t˜D+1
2
> z∗r , where am, alr < z
∗
r < amr.
Proof. See Appendix D.
The proposition implies that we should witness more majority governments than coalition
governments when the bargaining protocol is random.47 The reason is that with a random
47Testing this empirically is difficult. We would need to look at the set of multi-party systems which use
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recognition rule voters face uncertainty if they choose to elect a coalition. The implemented
policy will vary greatly depending on which party is randomly chosen as formateur. As
voters are risk averse, they find the certainty of policy provided by a majority government
appealing. The median voter in the median district need not prefer the policy of a non-
centrist party to that of party m in order for the former to win a majority of seats.
For example, if al = −1, D = 101, δ = 0.95 and |Q| = 0.25 then S = (50, 1, 50) would
bring about a lottery over policies (−0.229, 0, 0.229). The uncertainty generated means a
voter with t < −0.474 would prefer to elect an l majority government, a type slightly to the
right of alm, the indifferent type in the benchmark case. If instead we had |Q| = 0.5 and kept
the other parameters unchanged voters would face a lottery over policies (−0.459, 0, 0.459);
a type t < −0.396 would now prefer an l majority to a coalition government.
The proposition stacks the deck against a coalition government. It gives us the right-most
type who might ever want an l majority, that is when S−d = (D−12 , 0,
D−3
2
). This almost-equal
split of seats between the l and r party ensures huge variance in the coalition policy, making
a single party government very appealing. It is worth considering when an l majority would
be preferred to a more balanced coalition. Keep the parameters as in the example above
and let a district condition on S−d = (50, 25, 25) with l and r being serious in the district. If
|Q| = 0.25 then a victory for r will bring about a lottery (−0.105, 0, 0.105). A voter in this
district will prefer al to this lottery if t < −0.508. If instead |Q| = 0.5, a victory for r will
bring about a lottery (−0.209, 0, 0.209). A voter in this district will prefer al to this lottery
if t < −0.509. In contrast to the proposition, these less extreme cases have t˜D+1
2
< z∗l < alm
meaning it is more difficult for al to come about than in the benchmark model.
Along with the previous propositions on extreme policy outcomes, Proposition 10 shows
that no matter which of the bargaining rules is used, there is less scope for extreme outcomes
in legislative elections using plurality rule than there is in stand-alone plurality elections such
as mayoral or presidential elections. This remains true even when the coalition formation
process leads to large uncertainty over policy outcomes.
Almost all decisive events under this bargaining rule are λ(3) events and, as we know, if a
district is conditioning on such an event it must have misaligned voting. There are, however,
a selection of λ(2′) events which occur when sm = D−12 .
48 From Proposition 7, if a district
is conditioning on such an event and the dominated candidate is not serious, there will be
plurality to elect their legislature. Furthermore, we would need to know which of the two explicit proposer
rules (if any) they use in coalition formation. Thirdly, even if we could divide this set of legislatures into
fixed and random protocol systems, we would still face the problem that the distribution of voters in one
policy is different from those in another. Thus any evidence of more or less coalition governments between
systems could simply be the result of different underlying voter preferences.
48A figure showing the various decisive events in this case is available upon request.
41
no misaligned voting.
Proposition 11. For any distribution of voter preferences, in a legislative election with a
random order of bargaining over policy, δ < 1, and where ζ ≡ D+1
D−3
√
1−δ
1−δD+1
2D
:
1. If |Q| > |al
ζ
| or |Q| > |ar
ζ
| there exist equilibria with no misaligned voting in any district.
2. If |Q| < |al
ζ
|, |ar
ζ
| in every equilibrium there will be misaligned voting in at least one
district.
Proof. See Appendix D.
If |Q| > |al
ζ
| and each district has l and m as serious candidates then no voter type would
like to see party r win a seat. Electing r in a district would give S = (D−1
2
, D−1
2
, 1). Coalition
bargaining would lead to a lottery over policies very close to policies al and am, so voters
would prefer the certainty of either a l or m majority government. This result contrasts
with the case of fixed order bargaining in Proposition 9. There the cases where a party is
expected to win no seats are what drives misalignment; Here, it is exactly these cases where
misaligned voting can be excluded.
For large D and δ we will have |Q| < |al
ζ
|, |ar
ζ
|. However, we can still find equilibria with
no misaligned voting in as many as D− 1 districts. As I show in the proof, when sm = D−12
the expected policy which comes about by electing the smallest party in the legislature is
actually not preferred by any voter type. In this case, if a district focuses on the two national
frontrunners, there will be no misaligned voting. We can even find cases where there will
be misalignment in only a single district. If party m has a majority of seats, party r has
one seat, and l has the rest, then as long as all dm and dl districts have m and l as serious
candidates, only that single dr district will have misaligned voting. This gives a fresh insight
into the idea of “wasted votes”: if party l or r is expected to be the smallest of the parties
in the legislature, and party m is expected to have a majority, then the least popular non-
centrist party should optimally be abandoned by voters. Any district which actually elects
the weakest national party does so due to a coordination failure; a majority there would
instead prefer to elect one of the other two parties. Notice, however, that for this to be the
case, the moderate party must be expected to win an overall majority. So, while the idea of
a wasted vote does carry some weight, it clearly does not apply to the case of the Liberal
Democrats.
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Appendix D: Proofs for Appendix C
Bargaining Equilibrium for Fixed Order Protocol and δ < 1
As equilibria are stationary we need only consider two orderings: l > r > m > l > r > . . .
and r > l > m > r > l > . . .. I will derive the equilibrium offers for the case of l > r > m,
the other is almost identical. I solve the game by backward induction. At stage 3, party m
will make an offer ym which maximises its payoff subject to the proposal being accepted by
either party l or r.
At stage 2, party r will either make an offer yr(m) to attract party m, or an offer yr(l)
to attract party l. For these proposals to be accepted by m and l respectively requires
−yr(m)2 ≥ −(1− δ)Q2 − δy2m
−(al − yr(l))2 ≥ −(1− δ)(al −Q)2 − δ(al − ym)2
If yr(m) is chosen then the first inequality will bind and we have yr(m) =
√
(1− δ)Q2 + δy2m.
We can now compare the payoff of party l when yr(m) and yr(l) are implemented.
−(al −
√
(1− δ)Q2 + δy2m)2 = −a2l − (1− δ)Q2 − δy2m + 2al
√
(1− δ)Q2 + δy2m)
−(al − yr(l))2 = −a2l − (1− δ)Q2 − δy2m + (1− δ)2alQ+ δ2alym
Party l prefers policy yr(l) when
(1− δ)2alQ+ δ2alym > 2al
√
(1− δ)Q2 + δy2m)
2al((1− δ)Q+ δym) > 2al
√
(1− δ)Q2 + δy2m)
(1− δ)Q+ δym <
√
(1− δ)Q2 + δy2m)
the final inequality always holds. As party l gets a higher payoff from yr(l) than yr(m), the
former must be closer to al on the policy line, and therefore further away from ar. Clearly
then, party r maximises its utility by choosing yr =
√
(1− δ)Q2 + δy2m.
At stage 1, party l will either make an offer yl(m) to attract party m, or an offer yl(r) to
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attract party r. For these proposals to be accepted by m and r respectively requires
−yl(m)2 ≥ −(1− δ)Q2 − δ(−
√
(1− δ)Q2 + δy2m)2
−(ar − yl(r))2 ≥ −(1− δ)(ar −Q)2 − δ(ar −
√
(1− δ)Q2 + δy2m)2
If yl(m) is chosen then the first inequality will bind and we have yl(m) =
−√(1− δ2)Q2 + δ2y2m. We can now compare the payoff of party r when yl(m) and yl(r)
are implemented.
−(ar +
√
(1− δ2)Q2 + δ2y2m)2 = −a2r − (1− δ2)Q2 − δ2y2m − 2ar
√
(1− δ2)Q2 + δ2y2m)
−(ar − yl(r))2 = −(1− δ)(a2r +Q2 − 2arQ)− δa2r − δ(1− δ)Q2 − δ2y2m + δ2ar
√
(1− δ)Q2 + δy2m
Party r prefers policy yl(r) when
(1− δ)2arQ+ δ2ar
√
(1− δ)Q2 + δy2m > −2ar
√
(1− δ2)Q2 + δ2y2m)
(1− δ)Q+ δ
√
(1− δ)Q2 + δy2m > −
√
(1− δ2)Q2 + δ2y2m)
the final inequality always holds. As party r gets a higher payoff from yl(r) than yl(m), the
former must be closer to ar on the policy line, and therefore further away from al. Clearly
then, party l maximises its utility by choosing yl = −
√
(1− δ2)Q2 + δ2y2m.
Now, we can return to stage 3 to show that ym = 0. By stationarity, if ym is rejected at
stage 3, then in stage 4 yl = −
√
(1− δ2)Q2 + δ2y2m will be proposed and accepted. Parties
l and r will accept proposal ym if
−(al − ym)2 ≥ −(1− δ)(al −Q)2 − δ(al +
√
(1− δ2)Q2 + δ2y2m)2
−(ar − ym)2 ≥ −(1− δ)(ar −Q)2 − δ(ar +
√
(1− δ2)Q2 + δ2y2m)2
Party m’s payoff is maximised when ym = 0 (because am = 0), so we want to check whether
this is an implementable proposal. Letting ym = 0 and rearranging, the two inequalities
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above become
0 ≤ (1− δ3)Q2 + 2al[δ
√
(1− δ2)Q− (1− δ)Q]
0 ≤ (1− δ3)Q2 + 2ar[δ
√
(1− δ2)Q− (1− δ)Q]
The term in square brackets may be positive or negative. If it is positive then, party r will
accept ym = 0, if the term is negative then party l will accept ym = 0.
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Given ym = 0, we can now characterise the accepted policy proposals (and therefore
policy outcomes) for the fixed order protocol when l > r > m > l > r > . . ..
yl = −
√
(1− δ2)Q2
yr =
√
(1− δ)Q2
ym = 0
Instead when r > l > m > r > l > . . ., the same process gives:
yr =
√
(1− δ2)Q2
yl = −
√
(1− δ)Q2
ym = 0
Proof of Proposition 8
For z = al to be the expected outcome it must be that E(sl) >
D−1
2
. Given the restriction
that E(sm), E(sr) > 1, the set of distinct decisive events which dl districts can be conditioning
on is reduced to
Λsl=D−12 ,sm>1,sr>1
= {λ(al,−
√
(1− δ2)Q2,−
√
(1− δ2)Q2),
λ(al,−
√
(1− δ2)Q2,−
√
(1− δ)Q2),
λ(al,−
√
(1− δ)Q2,−
√
(1− δ)Q2)}
49Whenever δ > 0.543689 then the term is positive. Given that we mostly care about values of δ close to
one, we can say that it is generally party r who accepts m’s offer.
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Any race between al and −
√
(1− δ)Q2, where the former is the expected winner, must
have t˜ <
al−
√
(1−δ)Q2
2
. Any race between al and −
√
(1− δ2)Q2, where the former is the
expected winner, must have t˜ <
al−
√
(1−δ2)Q2
2
, a stricter condition. Therefore in order to
for a party l to win a majority in expectation when E(sm), E(sr) > 1 it must be at least
that t˜D+1
2
<
al−
√
(1−δ)Q2
2
. Notice that since −√(1− δ)Q2 < am, then al−√(1−δ)Q22 < alm.
Similarly, for party r to win a majority in expectation when E(sm), E(sl) > 1 it must be
that t˜D+1
2
>
ar+
√
(1−δ)Q2
2
> amr.
Proof of Proposition 10
Under this bargaining rule, we can only have E(z) = al if E(sl) >
D−1
2
. If this is the case,
any dl district must be conditioning on a decisive event in Λsl=D−12
. Each of these decisive
events are distinct: by increasing a party’s seat share by one, it alters the expected policy
outcome E(z). In order to find the weakest condition for E(z) = al to occur, I proceed in the
following steps. Steps 1 and 2 show that electing party l is always the worst option for a player
with t < 0. Step 3 shows that S = (D−1
2
, 1, D−1
2
) gives the lowest utility for any t < 0 type
conditional on sm > 0. Step 4 identifies the type who is indifferent between S = (
D−1
2
, 1, D−1
2
)
and a party l majority. Let Ω(r) ≡
√
1−δ
1−δD−sm
D
Q2 and Ω(m) ≡
√
1−δ
1−δD−(sm+1)
D
Q2. Note that
Ω(m) < Ω(r).
Step1: If ut(al) > ut(E(z
i
m)) or ut(al) > ut(E(z
i
r)), it must be that t < 0. I show the case
of ut(al) > ut(E(z
i
m)) as the other is analogous. Comparing the expected utility of a voter
voting for l or m where sl =
D−1
2
, sm > 0 and sr > 0 we have:
ut(l) = −(al − t)2
ut(m) = −D − 1
2D
(−Ω(m)− t)2 − sm + 1
D
(t)2 − D − 1− 2sm
2D
(Ω(m)− t)2
Some algebra shows that a player has ut(l) > ut(m) if
t <
Da2l − (D − sm)Ω(m)2
2Dal − (1− sm)2Ω(m)
The RHS must always be negative. It is easy to see that this would also be the case comparing
ut(l) to ut(r). Thus any player type who prefers al to a lottery over coalition policies must
have t < 0.
Step 2: At any decisive event λi ∈ Λsl=D−12 ,sr > 0 every t ≤ 0 prefers E(z
i
m) to E(z
i
r).
Comparing the expected utility of a voter voting for m or r for any case where sl =
D−1
2
,
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sm > 0 and sr > 0 we have:
ut(m) = −D − 1
2D
(−Ω(m)− t)2 − sm + 1
D
(t)2 − D − 1− 2sm
2D
(Ω(m)− t)2
ut(r) = −D − 1
2D
(−Ω(r)− t)2 − sm
D
(t)2 − D + 1− 2sm
2D
(Ω(r)− t)2
Some algebra shows that a player has ut(m) > ut(r) if
t <
(D − sm)(Ω(r)2 − Ω(m)2) + Ω(r)2
2(sm − 1)(Ω(r)− Ω(m)) + 2Ω(m)
The RHS must always be positive. This means that any type t ≤ 0 always prefers E(zim) to
E(zir).
Step 3: S = (D−1
2
, 1, D−1
2
) gives the lowest utility for any t < 0 type conditional on
sm > 0. Using the result from Step 2 and noting that E(z|S−dr = (D−12 , k, D−1−2k2 )) =
E(z|S−dm = (D−12 , k − 1, D+1−2k2 )) we can see that for a t ≤ 0 the least preferred expected
policy is E(z|S = (D−1
2
, 1, D−1
2
)).
Step 4: Identifying the type who prefers al to E(z|S = (D−12 , 1, D−12 )). To find the
rightmost type who prefers al to a coalition we thus examine S = (
D−1
2
, 1, D−3
2
). At this
point, electing party l gives them a majority and brings about z = al, while electing party
r leads to a coalition with an ex ante expected policy of
E
(
z|S = (D − 1
2
, 1,
D − 1
2
)
)
= −D − 1
2D
(√
1− δ
1− δD−1
D
Q2
)
+
2
2D
(0) +
D − 1
2D
(√
1− δ
1− δD−1
D
Q2
)
A voter will prefer the former if
−(al − t)2 > −D − 1
2D
(
−
√
1− δ
1− δD−1
D
Q2 − t
)2
− 2
2D
(−t)2 − D − 1
2D
(√
1− δ
1− δD−1
D
Q2 − t
)2
rearranging this we get that a voter prefers al if
t <
al
2
− D − 1
2Dal
(
1− δ
1− δ(D−1
D
)
Q2
)
As al < 0, the right hand side is greater than
al
2
, which is the cutoff point in the benchmark
case (recalling that alm =
al
2
when am = 0). The cutoff for a party l majority is thus given
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by
t˜D+1
2
< z∗l ≡
al
2
− D − 1
2Dal
(
1− δ
1− δ(D−1
D
)
Q2
)
> alm (29)
As z∗l > alm, the above result must also hold when sr = 0 as well as sr > 0.
Next we show that z∗l < am, alr. First, I show z
∗
l < am. Some manipulation shows
D − 1
2Dal
(
1− δ
1− δ(D−1
D
)
Q2
)
=
Q2
2al
D−1
D
− δD−1
D
D−1
D
− δD−1
D
+ 1
D
>
Q2
2al
(30)
Let P ≡ D−1D −δD−1DD−1
D
−δD−1
D
+ 1
D
where the inequality in Equation 30 comes from P < 1. In order to
show z∗l < am we need to show
al
2
− P (Q)2
2al
< 0. Given P < 1 and |Q| ≤ |al|, this immediately
follows.
Second, I show z∗l < alr. If ∆l < ∆r then necessarily alr > am, so the proof above applies.
If ∆l > ∆r we have z
∗
l < alr if
al
2
− P (Q)
2
2al
<
al
2
+
ar
2
P (Q)2
2|al| <
ar
2
As Q2 ≤ a2r and |al| > |ar|, the inequality above must hold.
Therefore, we have that a majority for party l , which brings about al can only occur if
t˜D+1
2
< z∗l ≡ al2 − D−12Dal
(
1−δ
1−δ(D−1
D
)
Q2
)
where z∗l < am, alr.
Analogously, a majority for party r , which brings about ar can only occur if t˜D+1
2
> z∗r ≡
ar
2
+ D−1
2Dar
(
1−δ
1−δ(D−1
D
)
Q2
)
where z∗r > am, alr.
Proof of Proposition 11
Case 1: If −|Q| < al
ζ
or ar
ζ
< |Q| there exist equilibria with no misaligned voting
in any district. When E(sl) >
D−1
2
and E(sr) = 0, voters will be conditioning on the point
(D−1
2
, D−1
2
, 0). Electing l or m brings about z = al or z = am = 0 respectively, each of which
are the preferred policies of t = −1 and t = 0. Electing r leads to an expected coalition
policy given by
ut(r) = −D − 1
2D
(
−
√
1− δ
1− δD+1
2D
Q2 − t
)2
− D − 1
2D
(t)2 − 2
2D
(√
1− δ
1− δD+1
2D
Q2 − t
)2
(31)
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Some algebra shows that there exists a type for which Equation 31 is greater than both ut(l)
and ut(m) if
− |Q| > al
ζ
(32)
where ζ ≡ D+1
D−3
√
1−δ
1−δD+1
2D
. Otherwise, if −|Q| < al
ζ
, then ut(r) is dominated for all voter
types, making (D−1
2
, D−1
2
, 0) a λ(2′) event. If each district has l and m as serious candidates
then there will be no misaligned voting. It is analogous to show that if ar
ζ
< |Q| < ar and
all districts have m and r as serious candidates, there is no misaligned voting.
Case 2: If |Q| > |al
ζ
|, |ar
ζ
| there will be misaligned voting in at least one district.
Case 2A: When sl >
D−1
2
or sr >
D−1
2
there will always be misaligned voting in some
districts. I examine the case where l is expected to win a majority; the other case is identical.
1) When E(sl) >
D−1
2
, E(sr) > 0 and E(sm) > 0 there will be misaligned voting. Voters
must be conditioning on a decisive event where sl =
D−1
2
; the expected utility of electing the
three different candidates is
ut(l) = −(al − t)2
ut(m) = −D − 1
2D
(
−
√
1− δ
1− δD−(sm+1)
D
Q2 − t
)2
− sm + 1
D
(t)2 − D − 1− 2sm
2D
(√
1− δ
1− δD−(sm+1)
D
Q2 − t
)2
ut(r) = −D − 1
2D
(
−
√
1− δ
1− δD−sm
D
Q2 − t
)2
− sm
D
(t)2 − D + 1− 2sm
2D
(√
1− δ
1− δD−sm
D
Q2 − t
)2
It suffices to consider the most extreme types t = −1, t = 0 and t = 1. Subbing these values
in we see that a type t = −1 will always want to elect l and a type t = 0 will always want to
elect m. For any case E(sl) >
D−1
2
, E(sr) > 0, E(sm) > 0, there must therefore be misaligned
voting as in the districts where r is expected to win, the other voters coordinate on either l
or m. The supporters of that candidate which is not serious must be casting misaligned votes.
2) When E(sl) >
D−1
2
and E(sm) = 0 there will be misaligned voting in every district.
Voters will be conditioning on the point (D−1
2
, 0, D−1
2
) where electing l or r brings about
z = al or z = ar respectively, each of which are the preferred policies of t = −1 and t = 1.
Electing m leads to an expected coalition policy given by
ut(m) = −D − 1
2D
(
−
√
1− δ
1− δD−1
D
Q2 − t
)2
− 2
2D
(t)2 − D − 1
2D
(√
1− δ
1− δD−1
D
Q2 − t
)2
Subbing in for t = 0, it is clear that u0(m) > u0(l), u0(r). As only 2 candidates receive votes,
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one of these player types must be casting a misaligned vote.
3)When E(sl) >
D−1
2
and E(sr) = 0 there will be misaligned voting when −ζ|Q| > al.
This follows directly from Case 1.
Case 2B: When no party has an expected majority there will be misaligned voting in some
districts. For any expected seat distribution where no party has a majority, the expected
utility of electing the three different candidates is
ut(l) = −sl + 1
D
(
−
√
1− δ
1− δD−sm
D
Q2 − t
)2
− sm
D
(t)2 − sr
D
(√
1− δ
1− δD−sm
D
Q2 − t
)2
ut(m) = − sl
D
(
−
√
1− δ
1− δD−(sm+1)
D
Q2 − t
)2
− sm + 1
D
(t)2 − sr
D
(√
1− δ
1− δD−(sm+1)
D
Q2 − t
)2
ut(r) = − sl
D
(
−
√
1− δ
1− δD−sm
D
Q2 − t
)2
− sm
D
(t)2 − sr + 1
D
(√
1− δ
1− δD−sm
D
Q2 − t
)2
Where I abuse notation slightly to let sc to be the expected number of seats of party c
before district d votes, so that sl + sm + sr = D − 1. By subbing in t = 0, we see that this
type will always want m elected. For there to be no misaligned voting it must therefore be
the case that m is a serious candidate in every district. Suppose this is the case so that
in a dr district r and m are serious candidates and in a dl district l and m are the serious
candidates. In a dr district a type t = 1 must have u1(r) > u1(m). Note that a dr district
conditions on r having one less seat and l having one more seat than a dl district conditions
on. Using the equations above one can show that if u1(r|(sl, sm, sr)) > u1(m|(sl, sm, sr))
then u1(r|(sl − 1, sm, sr + 1)) > u1(m|(sl − 1, sm, sr + 1)). That is, in a given equilibrium, if
a type t = 1 in a dr district prefers r to m, then a type t = 1 in a dl district also prefers r
to m. As this type also prefers r to l and the focal candidates in the dl district are l and m,
he must be casting a misaligned vote.
Case 2C: When sm >
D−1
2
there will be misaligned voting in at least one district.
If sm >
D−1
2
, all districts must be conditioning on decisive events where sm =
D−1
2
. In
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such cases the expected utility of a type t voter in voting for each of the parties is
ut(l) = −sl + 1
D
(
−
√
1− δ
1− δD+1
2D
Q2 − t
)2
− D − 1
2D
(t)2 − D − 1− 2sl
2D
(√
1− δ
1− δD+1
2D
Q2 − t
)2
ut(m) = − (t)2
ut(r) = − sl
D
(
−
√
1− δ
1− δD+1
2D
Q2 − t
)2
− D − 1
2D
(t)2 − D + 1− 2sl
2D
(√
1− δ
1− δD−1
2D
Q2 − t
)2
Note that for t = 0 we have ut(m) > ut(l) = ut(r). Any voter type with t < 0 has
ut(l) > ut(r), while any voter with t > 0 has ut(l) < ut(r). However, it could be that some
of these types prefer ut(m) to either of the other two. In order to check this I calculate the
derivative of each of the expected utilities with respect to t.
d[u(l)]
dt
= −2t+ D − 3− 4sl
D
(√
1− δ
1− δD+1
2D
Q2
)
d[u(m)]
dt
= −2t
d[u(r)]
dt
= −2t+ D + 1− 4sl
D
(√
1− δ
1− δD+1
2D
Q2
)
When sl <
D−3
4
then for any t < 0 we have d[u(m)]
dt
< d[u(l)]
dt
< d[u(r)]
dt
. Utility is increasing for
all three cases as we move towards 0. Given d[u(m)]
dt
< d[u(l)]
dt
for any t < 0 and ut(m) > ut(l) =
ut(r) for t = 0, it must be that for sl <
D−3
4
there is no type with ut(l) > ut(m), ut(r). When
sl >
D+1
4
then for any t > 0 we have d[u(m)]
dt
< d[u(r)]
dt
< d[u(l)]
dt
. Combined, with the fact that
we have ut(m) > ut(l) = ut(r) for t = 0, this means that for sl >
D+1
4
there is no type with
ut(r) > ut(m), ut(l).
What this means is that, conditional on sm =
D−1
2
, if sl <
D−3
4
, a district in which m and
r are the serious candidates will have no misaligned voting; and if sl >
D+1
4
then a district
in which m and l are the serious candidates will have no misaligned voting.
However, each equilibrium has misaligned voting in at least one district. Recall that
E(S−dl) = (sl − 1, sm, sr), E(S−dm) = (sl, sm − 1, sr) and E(S−dr) = (sl, sm, sr − 1). As
all the relevant decisive events occur at sm =
D−1
2
, dl and dr districts will have the same
“route” to being decisive. That is, in any equilibrium if dl districts are conditioning on
(k, D−1
2
, D−1
2
− k), then dr districts must be conditioning on (k + 1, D−12 , D−12 − (k + 1)).
When 0 < sl <
D−3
4
, all dm and dr districts are conditioning on λ(2
′) events. In any of
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these districts if the serious candidates are m and r, there is no misaligned voting. However,
we know that each dl district must either be conditioning on a λ(2
′) event or else a λ(3)
event (if it conditions on S−d = (0, D−12 ,
D−1
2
)). Whichever one of these is the case, there will
always be misaligned voting in these dl districts. Indeed, if a single dl district conditions on
S−dl = (0,
D−1
2
, D−1
2
), and the other districts are all races between m and r, it must be that
there is only misaligned voting in this single dl district. Examining the
D+1
4
< sl <
D−1
2
case gives the same insight for the mirror case; there’ll be no misaligned voting in dl or dm
districts if they focus on races between l and m, but there will always be misaligned voting
in the dr districts.
52
References
Austen-Smith, D., and J. S. Banks (1988): “Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative
Outcomes,” American Political Science Review, 82(2), 405–422.
(2005): Positive Political Theory II. University of Michigan Press.
Bandyopadhyay, S., K. Chatterjee, and T. Sjo¨stro¨m (2011): “Pre-electoral Coali-
tions and Post-election Bargaining,” Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 6(1), 1–53.
Bandyopadhyay, S., and M. P. Oak (2008): “Coalition governments in a model of
parliamentary democracy,” European Journal of Political Economy, 24(3), 554–561.
Banks, J. S., and J. Duggan (2000): “A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice,” Amer-
ican Political Science Review, 94(1), 73–88.
(2006): “A General Bargaining Model of Legislative Policy-making,” Quarterly
Journal of Political Science, 1(1), 49–85.
Baron, D. P. (1991): “A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parlia-
mentary Systems,” American Political Science Review, 85(1), 137–164.
Baron, D. P., and D. Diermeier (2001): “Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in
Proportional Representation Systems,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(3), 933–967.
Baron, D. P., and J. Ferejohn (1989): “Bargaining in Legislatures,” American Political
Science Review, 83(4), 1181–1206.
Bouton, L. (2013): “A Theory of Strategic Voting in Runoff Elections,” American Eco-
nomic Review, 103(4), 1248–1288.
Bouton, L., and M. Castanheira (2012): “One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority
and Information Aggregation,” Econometrica, 80(1), 43–87.
Bouton, L., and G. Gratton (2015): “Majority Runoff Rlections: Strategic Voting and
Duverger’s Hypothesis,” Theoretical Economics, 10(2), 283–314.
Cho, S.-j., and J. Duggan (2003): “Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibria in a One-
dimensional Model of Bargaining,” Journal of Economic Theory, 113(1), 118–130.
Cox, G. W. (1997): Making Votes Count. Cambirdge University Press.
53
Diermeier, D., and A. Merlo (2000): “Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democ-
racies,” Journal of Economic Theory, 94(1), 46–79.
Eraslan, H., D. Diermeier, and A. Merlo (2003): “A Structural Model of Government
Formation,” Econometrica, 71(1), 27–70.
Fey, M. (1997): “Stability and Coordination in Duverger’s Law: A Formal Model of Pre-
election Polls and Strategic Voting,” American Political Science Review, 91(1), 135–147.
Fisher, S. D., and D. P. Myatt (2014): “Strategic Voting in Plurality Rule Elections,”
mimeo.
Jackson, M. O., and B. Moselle (2002): “Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative
Voting Game,” Journal of Economic Theory, 103(1), 49–87.
Kalandrakis, A. (2004): “A Three-Player Dynamic Majoritarian Bargaining Game,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 116(2), 294–322.
Kawai, K., and Y. Watanabe (2013): “Inferring Strategic Voting,” American Economic
Review, 103(4), 624 – 662.
Krishna, V., and J. Morgan (2011): “Overcoming Ideological Bias in Elections,” Journal
of Political Economy, 119(2), 183–211.
Laslier, J.-F. (2012): “And the Loser Is Plurality Voting,” in Electoral Systems, ed. by
D. S. Felsenthal, and M. Machover, Studies in Choice and Welfare, pp. 327–351. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg.
McCarty, N., K. Poole, and H. Rosenthal (2008): Polarized America: The Dance
of Ideology and Unequal Riches. MIT press.
Milgrom, P. R., and R. J. Weber (1985): “Distributional Strategies for Games with
Incomplete Information,” Mathematics of Operations Research, 10(4), 619–632.
Morelli, M. (1999): “Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bar-
gaining,” American Political Science Review, 93(4), 809–820.
(2004): “Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems,”
Review of Economic Studies, 71(3), 829–853.
Myatt, D. P. (2007): “On the Theory of Strategic Voting,” Review of Economic Studies,
74(1), 255–281.
54
Myerson, R. B. (1998): “Population Uncertainty and Poisson Games,” International Jour-
nal of Game Theory, 27(3), 375–392.
(2000): “Large Poisson Games,” Journal of Economic Theory, 94(1), 7–45.
(2002): “Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 103(1), 219–251.
Myerson, R. B., and R. J. Weber (1993): “A Theory of Voting Equilibria,” American
Political Science Review, 87(1), 102–114.
Palfrey, T. R. (1989): “A Mathematical Proof of Duverger’s Law,” in Models of Strategic
Choice in Politics, ed. by P. C. Ordeshook, pp. 69–91. University of Michigan Press.
Polborn, M., and S. Krasa (2015): “Political Competition in Legislative Elections,”
mimeo.
55
